法学院知识库

随着数据处理技术的发展以及大数据领域产业规模的不断扩张，数据衍生出收集数据、数据库、推理数据三种表现形式，因其具有即时性、延展性、可复制性、天然独占性等特征，能够为大数据领域经营者带来竞争优势，获得市场支配地位。域内外如HIQ诉领英案、Facebook收购WhatsApp案、大众点评诉爱邦网等数据领域的案例频发，表明大数据领域拥有支配地位的经营者趋于将自身数据优势转化为竞争优势，通过强迫数据收集、多平台数据转移以及无正当理由拒绝数据交易、数据交易价格歧视等行为阻碍市场中的数据流通、限制以数据为核心的技术创新，从而巩固自身市场支配地位。上述行为不仅有损于数据相关市场的正常竞争秩序以及消费者数据权益，更有悖于我国发展数字经济，培育数据要素市场的战略方针。

根据国内外司法实践可得，要使大数据领域滥用市场支配地位的行为得到有效规制，需解决因数据领域多边市场竞争、网络效应等因素所导致的相关市场界定方法失灵以及市场份额无法准确反映数据领域市场竞争力等问题。通过对大数据领域滥用市场支配地位的类型化分析，将其划分为数据收集与数据交易两类。在此基础上，通过利润来源界定主要竞争市场，在假定垄断者测试中计算关联市场的影响以及将数据领域市场支配地位的认定标准细化为用户数据迁移成本、其他经营者数据获取的难易程度以及经营者对相关市场数据流通的控制能力。进而引入反事实度量法认定滥用市场支配地位行为，将大数据领域滥用市场支配地位扩张解释为滥用相对市场优势地位，以必要设施原则规制数据交易以及增设经营者处理数据的算法解释义务。通过上述举措的实施，以使我国反垄断现实司法能够有效规制大数据领域滥用市场支配地位行为，维护我国大数据领域市场竞争秩序。

With the development of data processing technology and data domain industry scale expanding, collect data, database, reasoning are derived from the data of three kinds of forms, because of its immediacy, ductility, replicable, natural monopoly characteristics, can bring competitive advantage for large data field operator, a dominant market position. Frequent cases in the field of data, such as HIQ v. linkedin, Facebook v. WhatsApp, Dianping v. Aibang, indicate that operators with dominant positions in the field of big data tend to turn their data advantages into competitive advantages. Through forced data collection, multi-platform data transfer, rejection of data transactions without justified reasons, price discrimination of data transactions and other behaviors, data circulation in the market is obstructed and data-centered technological innovation is restricted to consolidate its dominant position in the market. The behaviors mentioned above not only harm the normal competition order of data-related market and the rights and interests of consumers' data, but also go against China's strategic policy of developing digital economy and cultivating data factor market.

According to the judicial practice at home and abroad, in order to effectively regulate the abuse of dominant market position in the field of big data, the failure of relevant market definition methods and the failure of market share to accurately reflect the market competitiveness in the field of data caused by factors such as multilateral market competition and network effect should be solved. This paper classifies abuse of dominant market position in big data into data collection and data transaction. On this basis, through the main profit source definition competition market, related calculation in this test the assumption that monopoly market and the influence of dominant market position in the field of data standards elaboration to the user data migration cost and other business operators to the difficulty of the data acquisition and control the flow of operators of the relevant market data. Furthermore, counterfactual measurement is introduced to identify the abuse of dominant position in the field of big data, and the abuse of dominant position expansion in the field of big data is interpreted as the abuse of relative dominant position in the market. Through the implementation of the above measures, to enable China's antitrust judicial reality can effectively regulate the abuse of dominant market position in the field of big data, maintain the market competition order in the field of big data in China.