基于“政银保农”四方博弈的农业小额贷款保证保险发展研究——以广东省三水区为例

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作者	张淑慧
姓名汉语拼音	Zhang Shuhui
学号	2019000005012
培养单位	兰州财经大学
电话	13869222875
电子邮件	498975328@qq.com
入学年份	2019-9
学位类别	专业硕士
培养级别	硕士研究生
一级学科名称	保险
学科代码	0255
第一导师姓名	王振军
第一导师姓名汉语拼音	Wang Zhenjun
第一导师单位	兰州财经大学
第一导师职称	教授
题名	基于“政银保农”四方博弈的农业小额贷款保证保险发展研究——以广东省三水区为例
英文题名	Research on the development of agricultural microfinance guarantee insurance based on the four party game of "government, bank,insurance and agriculture" -- a case study of Sanshui District, Guangdong Province
关键词	农业小额贷款保证保险 “政银保农”四方博弈 “政银保”模式实证分析广东省三水区
外文关键词	Agricultural micro loan guarantee insurance ; Four party game of "government, bank, insurance and agriculture" ; "Government bank insurance" mode ; Empirical analysis ; Sanshui District of Guangdong Province
摘要	一直以来，“贷款难”问题是导致农村经济发展缓慢的重要原因之一。农业小额贷款保证保险的出现，缓解了这一问题，但在其发展过程中仍然面临着承保风险大，保险事故频发等问题，严重影响了保险公司进入农业贷款市场的积极性，从而影响农村经济和农村金融的发展。究其原因，一方面是因为农业的弱质性，生产周期长，险种缺少抵押物等，另一方面是因为农户存在道德风险和逆选择，保险公司与银行信息不对称，政府职能发挥不充分等。因此，为促进农业小额贷款保证保险的发展，必须提高保险公司进入农业贷款市场的积极性，解决保险公司在开展农业小额贷款保证保险业务中遇到的困难。本文在研究方法上主要使用了文献研究法和博弈分析法，通过对广东省三水区“政银保”合作农业贷款模式产生背景及发展成效的分析，发现该模式促进了农业小额贷款保证保险的发展，打破了以往农业小额贷款保证保险发展缓慢的局面。基于此，文章建立“政银保农”四方博弈模型，分析农业小额贷款保证保险发展的影响因素，进而探究广东省三水区“政银保”模式下农业小额贷款保证保险迅速发展的原因。模型选定影响四方收益的 12 个参数，根据四方策略即：政府是否补贴、银行是否贷款、保险公司是否承保、农户是否投保和贷款，将四方策略组合主要分为7组，研究不同策略下四方的预期收益，得到影响四方策略均衡的因素，然后通过调节影响因素促使四方均参与农业贷款市场，从而促进农业小额贷款保证保险的发展。从博弈分析中发现广东省三水区“政银保”模式解决了导致保险公司不积极参与农业贷款市场的问题，即政府通过采取措施限制了农户违约行为、促进了银保合作，调动了银行、保险公司和农户参与农业贷款市场的积极性。广东省三水区农业小额贷款保证保险的成功试点给该险种在全国范围内的发展提供了思路，分别从政府层面、保险公司与银行合作层面、农户层面提出对策建议。通过本文的研究为农业小额贷款保证保险的发展提供可行性建议，从而更好的服务农村经济发展。
英文摘要	All along, "loan difficulty" is one of the important reasons for the slow development of rural economy. The emergence of agricultural micro loan guarantee insurance has alleviated this problem, but in its development process, it still faces problems such as high underwriting risk and frequent insurance accidents, which seriously affects the enthusiasm of insurance companies to enter the agricultural loan market, thus affecting the development of rural economy and rural finance. On the one hand, it is because of the weakness of agriculture, long production cycle, lack of collateral for insurance types, on the other hand, it is because farmers have moral hazard and adverse selection, asymmetric information between insurance companies and banks, insufficient play of government functions and so on. Therefore, in order to promote the development of agricultural microfinance guarantee insurance, we must improve the enthusiasm of insurance companies to enter the agricultural loan market and solve the difficulties encountered by insurance companies in carrying out agricultural microfinance guarantee insurance business. This paper mainly uses the literature research method and game analysis method in the research method. Through the analysis of the background and development effect of the "government bank insurance" cooperative agricultural loan model in Sanshui District, Guangdong Province, it is found that this model promotes the development of agricultural microfinance guarantee insurance and breaks the slow development of agricultural microfinance guarantee insurance in the past. Based on this, this paper establishes a four party game model of "government, bank and agriculture", analyzes the influencing factors of the development of agricultural microfinance guarantee insurance, and then explores the reasons for the rapid development of agricultural microfinance guarantee insurance under the "government, bank and insurance" model in Sanshui District, Guangdong Province. The model selects 12 parameters that affect the Quartet's income. According to the Quartet's strategy, that is, whether the government subsidizes, whether the bank loans, whether the insurance company underwrites, whether the farmers insure and loan, the Quartet's strategy combination is mainly divided into seven groups, studies the expected income of the Quartet under different strategies, obtains the factors affecting the equilibrium of the Quartet's strategy, and then promotes the Quartet to participate in the agricultural loan market by adjusting the influencing factors, So as to promote the development of agricultural microfinance guarantee insurance. From the game analysis, it is found that the "government, bank and insurance" model in Sanshui District, Guangdong province solves the problem that insurance companies do not actively participate in the agricultural loan market, that is, the government takes measures to limit farmers' breach of contract, promote bank and insurance cooperation, and mobilize the enthusiasm of banks, insurance companies and farmers to participate in the agricultural loan market. The successful pilot of agricultural microfinance guarantee insurance in Sanshui District of Guangdong Province provides ideas for the development of agricultural microfinance guarantee insurance in China, and puts forward countermeasures and suggestions from the government level, the cooperation level between insurance companies and banks and the farmers level. Through the research of this paper, it provides feasible suggestions for the development of agricultural microfinance guarantee insurance, so as to better serve the development of rural economy.
学位类型	硕士
答辩日期	2022-05-29
学位授予地点	甘肃省兰州市
研究方向	社会保险理论与政策
语种	中文
论文总页数	60
参考文献总数	46
馆藏号	0004349
保密级别	公开
中图分类号	F84/64
文献类型	学位论文
条目标识符	http://ir.lzufe.edu.cn/handle/39EH0E1M/32053
专题	金融学院
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	张淑慧. 基于“政银保农”四方博弈的农业小额贷款保证保险发展研究——以广东省三水区为例[D]. 甘肃省兰州市. 兰州财经大学,2022.

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