会计学院知识库

2020年3月新修订的《中华人民共和国证券法》（以下简称“《证券法》”）正式实施，新《证券法》规定会计师事务所从事证券业务由审批制改为备案制，事务所进入证券服务业的硬性门槛大幅降低，市场竞争环境更加公平。在实行备案制的同时，证监会也大幅提升了对违法违规行为的处罚力度。在新的监管模式之下，监管部门实现由“审”到“监”的角色转变,一定程度上赋予证券服务机构更多的权利。而与权利增加对应的是执业要求的提高。T事务所作为备案制背景下第一家承接证券业务的中小规模事务所，在承接业务后即受到监管部门的高度关注，但监管并没有促进T所执业质量的提高，最终T所仍出具了不恰当的审计意见，导致了审计失败。因此探究T事务所审计失败的原因并提出改进措施，对备案制背景下防范审计失败发生具有十分重要的现实意义和应用价值。

研究采用案例研究法与博弈分析法相结合的方式，首先阐述了X公司舞弊手段和T事务所审计程序存在的缺陷。其次，运用博弈分析的方法，从涉及审计失败的三方博弈主体（被审计单位、注册会计师、监管机构）出发，构建包括各参与方的四阶段不完全信息动态博弈模型，并采用逆向归纳法求解，发现三者间的行动策略存在相互作用且会影响最终审计的结果。再次，运用博弈模型的结论分析T事务所审计失败原因，这些原因有企业内部控制不完善，会计信息失真；注册会计师缺乏审计条件，未保持独立，人为减少审计程序；监管力度弱等。最后，在模型的解的基础上围绕被审计单位、会计师事务所、监管机构三个方面提出防范策略：在被审计单位方面通过健全内部控制体系，优化资本结构等措施降低舞弊的概率；在会计师事务所方面通过加强审计资源管理、规范审计收费、完善轮换制度等手段，降低事务所参与审计合谋的概率；在监管机构层面通过运用大数据技术等举措，提高监管概率。

March 2020, the newly amended Securities Law of the People's In March 2020, the new Securities Law of the People's Republic of China (the "Securities Law") officially came into effect, allowing accounting enterprises to provide securities services under a registration system instead of a licensing system, which significantly reduces the barriers to entry for enterprises in the securities services industry and raises the level of the market. With the introduction of the registration system, the SFC has also significantly increased the penalties for breaches of the law. Under the new regulatory model, the regulator has changed its role from 'auditor' to 'supervisor', giving more powers to securities services providers; the increased powers have been accompanied by increased corporate requirements. Firm T, the first SME to start providing securities services, received a great deal of attention from the regulator when it was launched, but regulation did not improve the quality of its work, and ultimately Firm T continued to issue poor quality audit reports, resulting in failed audits. It is therefore important to investigate the reasons for the audit failure at firm T and propose remedial measures in relation to the reporting system to prevent the occurrence of failed audits.

This study combines case study and game analysis techniques to first identify the fraud in Company X and the deficiencies in the audit procedures in Company T. Then using game analysis, a dynamic four-stage model of an imperfect information game is created for the three parties involved in failed audit (auditor, auditee, and regulator), which is solved by backward induction.Based on the results of the game model, the causes of audit failure in firm T are also analyzed, including inadequate internal controls, accounting misstatements, inadequate audit environment, artificially reduced maintenance of independence and audit procedures, and inadequate supervision. Finally, based on the solutions proposed by the model, three aspects are suggested: on the auditor's side, the possibility of fraud is reduced through measures such as improving internal controls and optimizing the capital structure; on the auditor's side, the possibility of audit collusion is reduced by strengthening the management of audit resources, standardizing audit fees, and improving the rotation system. Preventive strategies are proposed to address three aspects. At the level of regulators, initiatives such as the use of technology to process large data sets will improve supervisory capacity.