金融学院知识库

随着脱贫攻坚战的全面胜利，我国向着第二个百年奋斗目标迈进，而在此基础上进一步巩固脱贫攻坚成果，守正创新推进乡村振兴事业发展，加快农业农村现代化进程，是事关发展大局的关键问题。财政支农和金融支农作为推动乡村振兴战略发展和实现农业农村现代化的重要抓手，在“三农”事业发展中扮演着关键角色。但与此同时，财政支农和金融支农存在支农结构失衡、协同效率低的问题，不利于资源有效配置和支农政策意图落实。因此充分协调好财政支农和金融支农的关系，解决支农主体利益不均衡问题，对推进乡村振兴战略和实现共同富裕目标有着重要意义。

本文首先对研究背景和意义进行介绍，接着对学界关于财政支农、金融支农的相关研究进行了梳理，进而指出财政支农和金融支农存在的问题：地方政府在体制内利益激励下通过项目制手段“经营村庄”，导致财政支农结构失衡，造成“马太效应”；金融支农由于农村金融市场风险高、收益低的客观现实而产生金融排斥，造成金融支农被“精英俘获”、支农结构失衡、农村地区金融抑制严重等问题。接着对支农主体利益同质性和异质性进行阐述，分析了财政支农和金融支农的互动逻辑。其次，为进一步阐明财政支农与金融支农是如何在支农过程中构建联系和产生互动的，本文基于演化博弈理论，构建地方政府和金融机构的两方演化博弈模型，对支农参与主体的演化博弈策略进行分析，根据约束条件的不同得到不同的均衡点，并分析得出：在无约束条件下将形成地方政府集中投资和金融机构掐尖服务的局面；在有效约束条件下将形成地方政府分散投资和金融机构普惠服务的局面。再次，对博弈主体的不同策略选择，使用MATLAB软件进行仿真模拟实验，研究参与主体的动态博弈过程及均衡实现路径，分析各参数对支农策略发展演化路径的影响和参与主体的均衡稳定策略。最后，针对性提出财政支农创新、金融支农创新和财政金融协同创新的对策建议。

With the overall victory of the battle against poverty, China is moving towards the second centenary goal. On this basis, further consolidating the achievements of poverty alleviation, promoting the development of rural revitalization by integrity and innovation, and accelerating the process of agricultural and rural modernization are key issues concerning the overall development. As an important starting point to promote the strategic development of rural vitalization and promote the realization of agricultural and rural modernization, financial and fiscal support for agriculture plays a key role in the development of "agriculture, rural areas and farmers". However, at the same time, fiscal support and financial support for agriculture have the problems of imbalance in agricultural support structure and low coordination efficiency, which is not conducive to the effective allocation of resources and the implementation of the intention of agricultural support policies. So it is of great significance to promote the rural revitalization strategy and achieve the goal of common prosperity to coordinate the relationship between fiscal support and financial support for agriculture and solve the imbalance of the interests of agricultural supporters.

This paper firstly introduces the background and significance of the research, analyzes the relevant studies of fiscal support for agriculture and financial support for agriculture, and then points out the problems existed: under the incentive of interests within the interests of the system, the local government "manages villages" through project system, which leads to the imbalance of financial support for agriculture structure, resulting in "Matthew effect";due to the objective reality of high risk and low return of rural financial market, financial agricultural support is captured by the "elite", the imbalance of agricultural support structure, and caused the serious financial suppression in rural areas.Secondly, in order to further clarify how fiscal and financial support can build connection and interaction in the process of supporting agriculture, this paper uses the method of evolutionary game to construct the two-party evolution game model of local government and financial institutions, analyzes the evolution game strategy of the participants, and obtains different equilibrium points according to the constraint conditions. The study tells that:under unconstrained conditions, local governments will concentrate on investment and financial institutions will provide top services;under the condition of effective constraints, local governments will diversify their investment and provide financial institutions with inclusive services.Thirdly, against the different strategy choice of the game subject , using MATLAB software to carry out simulation experiment, study the dynamic game process and equilibrium realization path of the participants, analyze the influence of each parameter on the development and evolution path of agricultural support strategy and the stable equilibrium strategy of the participants. Finally, the countermeasures and suggestions of fiscal agricultural innovation, financial agricultural innovation and fiscal-financial collaborative innovation are put forward.