MBA教育中心知识库

摘  要

  现代企业所有权、经营权和法人财产权分离，衍生出了委托代理问题。我国国有控股上市公司特有的双层代理问题即政府官员代理出资人和国企管理者代理政府践行管理权，这使得其自身的代理问题更加明显。《国有控股上市公司（境内）实施股权激励试行办法》的颁布实施，对于解决委托代理问题，保障国有控股上市公司行稳致远，发挥着重要作用。但由于我国国有控股上市公司长期以来实行以工资加奖金为主的薪酬模式，在股权激励实施方面起步较晚，而且外部市场环境与相关法律政策也还均处在不断完善的过程当中，这使得部分国有控股上市公司在对股权激励制度的探索中收获的效果并不理想。因此，如何制定出一套适合国有控股上市公司保障国有资产保值增值的股权激励计划就显得尤为关键。

  本文选取甘肃省省属国有控股上市公司实施股权激励计划的第一家公司“甘咨询”作为案例研究对象，首先介绍了股权激励的研究背景和研究意义，然后通过对股权激励相关文献的阅读，梳理并总结了现阶段国内外学者对于股权激励影响因素和实施效果的研究观点。接着本文对股权激励的相关理论进行了阐述并对国有控股上市公司股权激励的实施动因及影响因素进行了分析，然后再介绍了股权激励实施效果的评价标准。再接着本文对甘咨询股权激励方案内容及实施过程做出了详细的描述。最后依据股权激励实施效果的评价标准，从管理者行为、公司业绩、股票价格三方面对甘咨询的股权激励实施效果进行横向与纵向的对比分析，并据此对甘咨询股权激励的实施效果做出评价。

  通过对甘咨询股权激励案例分析的结果来看，本文认为甘咨询股权激励在实施效果方面仍有提升空间。该公司股权激励的实施虽然减少了管理者的一些经营短视行为，带来了净利润的稳中有升以及股价的短暂上涨。但在减少管理者融资和投资短视行为，提升盈利质量以及带动股价持续上涨方面均还有所欠缺。究其原因，本文认为主要可以归结为以下三点：股权激励的监管机制尚不健全、公司治理结构尚不合理、业绩考核指标设计尚不完善。针对甘咨询股权激励计划实施过程中存在的不足之处，本文提出了以下三条完善建议：健全股权激励实施的有效监管机制、优化公司的治理结构、构建多元化的业绩指标体系。

关键词：股权激励 效果评价标准 实施效果

Abstract

    The separation of ownership, management rights and legal person property rights in modern enterprises leads to the problem of principal-agent. The unique double agency problem of state-owned listed companies in China, that is, government officials acting as investors and state-owned enterprise managers acting on behalf of the government to exercise management rights, makes their own agency problems more obvious. The promulgation and implementation of the "Trial Measures for Implementing Equity Incentives for State-controlled Listed Companies (Domestic)" has played an important role in solving the problem of entrustment and agency and ensuring the stable and long-term development of state-controlled listed companies. However, due to the long-term implementation of the salary and bonus-based compensation model in China's state-owned listed companies, the implementation of equity incentives started late, and the external market environment and related legal policies are still in the process of continuous improvement, which makes the implementation of equity incentives relatively late. Some state-controlled listed companies have not achieved very satisfactory results in the exploration of the equity incentive system. Therefore, how to formulate a set of equity incentive plans suitable for state-controlled listed companies to ensure the preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets is particularly critical.

    This paper selects Gansu Consulting, the first company that implements equity incentive plan in a provincial state-owned listed company in Gansu Province as the case study object, firstly introduces the research background and research significance of equity incentive, and then through the reading of equity incentive related literature, This paper sorts out and summarizes the research views of domestic and foreign scholars on the influencing factors and implementation effects of equity incentives at this stage. Then this paper expounds the relevant theories of equity incentives and analyzes the implementation motivation and influencing factors of equity incentives in state-controlled listed companies, and then introduces the evaluation criteria for the implementation effect of equity incentives. Then, this paper makes a detailed description of the content and implementation process of the equity incentive plan of Gansu Engineering Consulting Group. Finally, according to the evaluation criteria of the implementation effect of equity incentives, this paper conducts a horizontal and vertical comparative analysis on the implementation effect of equity incentives of Gansu Engineering Consulting Group from the aspects of managerial behavior, company performance and stock price.

    According to the results of the case analysis of Gansu Engineering Consulting Group's equity incentive, this paper believes that the Gansu Engineering Consulting Group's equity incentive plan still have space to improve. Although the implementation of the company's equity incentives has reduced the short-sighted behavior of managers to a certain extent, it has brought about a steady rise in net profit and a short-term rise in stock prices. However, there are still some shortcomings in reducing the short-sighted behavior of managers' financing and investment, improving the quality of earnings and driving the continuous rise of stock prices. Investigating the reasons, this paper believes that it can be mainly attributed to the following three points: the supervision mechanism of equity incentives is not perfect, the corporate governance structure is not yet reasonable, and the design of performance appraisal indicators is not perfect. Aiming at the shortcomings in the implementation of the equity incentive plan of Gansu Engineering Consulting Group, this paper puts forward the following three suggestions for improvement: improve the effective supervision mechanism of equity incentive implementation, optimize the company's governance structure, and build a diversified performance indicator system.

Keywords：Equity incentive; Effect evaluation standard; Implementation Effect