兰州财经大学机构知识库

股权质押问题的早期研究起始于国外和台湾，我国大陆学者对股权质押的

研究起步较晚，因为股权质押制度在我国是最近十几年才逐渐形成。从2013年

起，伴随着沪深交易所联合中国证券登记结算公司发布《股票质押式回购交易

及登记结算业务办法（试行）》，股权质押融资这一便捷的融资方式在国内市

场爆炸式增长。而且由于国内上市公司股权较为集中，控股股东掌握了公司的

主要控制权，导致高比例股权质押的案例层出不穷。

本文首先通过文献梳理控股股东股权质押的动机，质押风险，质押风险的

应对方式，以及控股股东高比例股权质押导致的经济后果四个方面。然后进行

高比例股权质押对公司价值影响的理论机理分析，从盈余管理，股利政策选择，

过度投资，信息披露策略，资本运作路径来总结控股股东高比例股权质押后可

能对公司价值影响的机理。案例部分以雪松发展公司为具体的研究对象，分析

控股股东高比例股权质押的动机和资金投向，最后说明控股股东高比例股权质

押造成的经济后果。对雪松发展公司“高送转”的方式刺激股价，操纵公司停

牌控制股价，虚假回购股份提升股价，违法违规操纵信息披露这四条路径进行

分析。随后又通过选取各项盈利能力指标，偿债能力指标和发展能力指标来分

析控股股东高比例股权质押之后公司的财务价值受到的影响，用Z-score模型对

财务价值进行综合分析，验证高比例股权质押后各个时间段财务风险的变化。

最后通过Q值理论和EVA模型来对高比例股权质押后公司的价值进行综合分析。

文章通过理论与案例相结合的研究分析，最终得出了雪松发展公司控股股

东高比例股权质押的目的，以及控股股东高比例股权质押使公司遭受退市风险，

造成公司财务状况恶化，致使公司价值下降的结论。并对质权人提出了建立全

面并且完善的尽职调查制度 ，投资者应该持续关注公司近几年的资本运作公告

和审计报告。质押公司应加强内部控制，完善公司章程相关制度，引入一些机

构投资者来使公司的投资主体多元化，同时对高管设立完善的股权激励计划。

市场监管部门应该对上市公司控股股东超过一定质押率的表决权进行限制，对

上市公司控股股东股权质押的具体信息进行详细披露。

The early research on equity pledge began in foreign countries and 

Taiwan, and Chinese mainland scholars started to study equity pledge late, 

because equity pledge system has gradually formed in recent ten years. 

Since 2013, equity pledge financing, a convenient financing method, has 

exploded in the domestic market with the issuance by the Shanghai and 

Shenzhen Exchanges and the China Securities Depository and Clearing 

Corporation of the "Business Measures for Stock Pledge Repo 

Transactions and Registration and Settlement (Trial)". Moreover, due to 

the concentration of equity in domestic listed companies, the controlling 

shareholder has the main control right of the company, which leads to the 

endless cases of high proportion of equity pledge.

Firstly, this paper reviews the motivation of equity pledge by 

controlling shareholders, the risk of pledge, the way to deal with the risk 

of pledge, and the economic consequences caused by the high proportion 

of equity pledge by controlling shareholders. Then the theoretical 

mechanism of the influence of high proportion of equity pledge on 

corporate value is analyzed, from earnings management, dividend policy 

choice, over investment, information disclosure strategy, capital operation 

path to summarize the possible influence mechanism of controlling 

shareholder's high proportion of equity pledge on corporate value. The 

case part takes Cedar Development Company as the specific research 

object, analyzes the motivation and capital investment of the controlling 

shareholder's high proportion of equity pledge, and finally explains the 

economic consequences caused by the controlling shareholder's high 

proportion of equity pledge. Cedar development company "high transfer" 

way to stimulate the stock price, manipulating the company suspension 

control stock price, false buyback shares to increase the stock price, 

illegal manipulation of information disclosure these four paths are 

analyzed. Then, by selecting various profitability indicators, solvency 

indicators and development ability indicators to analyze the influence of 

the controlling shareholder's high proportion of equity pledge on the 

company's financial value, the Z-score model is used to comprehensively 

analyze the financial value, and verify the change of financial risk in 

various time periods after the high proportion of equity pledge. Finally, 

through the Q value theory and EVA model to make a comprehensive 

analysis of the value of the company after the high proportion of equity 

pledge.

Through the combination of theory and case analysis, this paper 

finally draws the conclusion that the purpose of the high proportion of 

shares pledged by the controlling shareholder of Cedar Development 

Company, and the high proportion of shares pledged by the controlling 

shareholder makes the company suffer from the risk of delisting, causing 

the deterioration of the company's financial condition and the decline of 

the company's value. It also proposes to establish a comprehensive and 

perfect due diligence system for the pledgee, and investors should 

continue to pay attention to the company's capital operation

announcement and audit report in recent years. Pledge companies should 

strengthen internal control, improve the relevant system of the company's 

articles of association, introduce some institutional investors to diversify 

the company's investment subjects, and set up a perfect equity incentive 

plan for senior executives. The market supervision department should 

restrict the voting rights of the controlling shareholders of listed 

companies beyond a certain pledge rate and disclose the specific 

information of the equity pledge of the controlling shareholders of listed 

companies in detail.