作者关俊棒
姓名汉语拼音Guan,Junbang
学号2019000008129
培养单位兰州财经大学
电话15839675471
电子邮件2656709536@qq.com
入学年份2019-9
学位类别学术硕士
培养级别硕士研究生
学科门类管理学
一级学科名称工商管理
学科方向会计学
学科代码120201
授予学位管理学硕士
第一导师姓名李希富
第一导师姓名汉语拼音Li,Xifu
第一导师单位兰州财经大学
第一导师职称教授
题名管理层风险偏好、会计稳健性与债务融资成本
英文题名Management risk appetite, accounting conservatism and debt financing costs
关键词管理层风险偏好 会计稳健性 债务融资成本 货币政策 产权性质
外文关键词Management risk preference ; Accounting conservatism ; Debt financing cost ; Monetary policy ; Property rights
摘要

    企业债务融资成本一直以来广受学界关注。传统经济理论所提出的企业这一会计主体是完全“理性”的,企业管理者个人特征也就不可能主观影响企业决策行为但是伴随着现代经济理论的兴起,更多学者经研究提出了完全“理性”过于理想化,由于企业管理者总会受到情感方面的影响,就会必不可少地做出非理性行为。考虑到管理者作为公司决策行为的制定者,在债务融资行为方面具备首要职责和地位,所以现代经济理论开始意识到企业管理层完全理性存在失之公允,于是从管理者主观非理性行为开始深入研究现代企业投融资决策是十分必要的。有学者主张管理者对风险的对待态度会对企业决策产生影响,经检验并发现了管理者风险偏好、过度自信、过度乐观等个人特质都与企业决策行为息息相关。鉴于写作时间的局限本文仅研究了管理层风险偏好这一方面对债务融资成本的影响。于是,本文经过总结该领域的研究成果同样认为债务融资成本会受到管理层风险偏好的作用。经过对相关研究文章的阅读,发现深入探讨该方面的研究可以丰富现有研究内容,因此,深入研究管理层风险偏好对债务融资成本的影响是可行的。

    本文先是将现有研究成果进行整理,从前景理论、债务契约理论、优序融资理论、信号传递理论、信息不对称理论这五个方面阐释了文章研究内容所依据的理论基础,然后将这些理论充分应用到理论分析及机理的演绎推理,并以此推出了本研究所提倡的理论假说。接着对相关变量定义及线性回归模型进行具体阐述,以更好的开展实证分析。论文借助实证方法研究了管理层风险偏好对企业债务融资成本的影响,并进一步剖析了二者之间关系的中间传导路径。实证研究结果表明:管理层风险偏好使得企业债务融资中发生的费用明显提高,而会计稳健性正是影响二者相关关系的中介传导变量。鉴于管理层风险偏好对债务融资成本的负面影响,本文进一步分析了货币政策、产权性质均可以作为管理层风险偏好影响债务融资成本的管控因素,旨在强化上市公司在进行债务融资决策过程中充分考虑外部宏观货币政策以及自身属性的认知,结合内外部相关影响因素做出针对性、合理性决策行为,以减少管理层风险偏好带来融资方面的经济后果。进一步分析研究得出:货币政策能够有效缓解管理层风险偏好对债务融资成本的促进作用;就国有企业而言,管理层风险偏好对债务融资成本的影响更弱。之后对实证分析结果进行稳健性检验提高数据结果的可靠性最后提出了本文的研究结论及政策性建议

 

英文摘要

Enterprise debt financing cost has been widely concerned by academic circles. The accounting subject of enterprise proposed by traditional economic theory is completely "rational", and the personal characteristics of enterprise managers cannot affect the decision-making behavior of enterprises subjectively. However, with the rise of modern economic theory, more scholars have proposed that complete "rationality" is too idealized, because enterprise managers are always affected by emotion, they will inevitably make irrational behaviors. Considering the managers as the makers of decision-making behavior, in the aspect of debt financing behavior has the primary responsibility and position, so the modern economic theory began to realize enterprise management perfectly rational existence lost fair, started from managers subjective irrationality to in-depth study of modern enterprise investment and financing decision is very necessary. Some scholars argue that managers' attitude towards risk will have an impact on corporate decision-making. After examination, they have found that managers' personal traits such as risk preference, overconfidence and over-optimism are closely related to corporate decision-making behaviors. Due to the limitation of writing time, this paper only studies the impact of management risk preference on debt financing cost. Therefore, after summarizing the research results in this field, this paper also believes that debt financing cost will be affected by the risk preference of management. After reading relevant research articles, it is found that in-depth research on this aspect can enrich the existing research content. Therefore, it is feasible to further study the impact of management risk preference on debt financing cost.

In present document, the existing research results are sorted out. From the prospect theory, debt contract theory, the optimal sequence financing theory, signaling theory, information asymmetry theory this five aspects to explain the theoretical foundation for the research, and then put forward theories to theoretical analysis and the deductive reasoning mechanism, and puts forward the hypothesis of this article. Then it introduces the definition of relevant variables and the definition of linear regression model in order to better carry out empirical analysis. With the help of subjective method, present document study that the influence of management risk preference on corporate debt financing cost, and further analyzes the intermediate transmission path of the relationship between the two. The empirical results show that management risk preference significantly increases debt financing interest and accounting prudence is the intermediary transmission variable that affects the correlation between the two. Given the management risk preference of the negative impact of debt financing cost, the paper further analyzes the monetary policy, property rights property all risk appetite can be used as a management factors affecting the debt financing cost control, to strengthen in the process of debt financing decision of listed company fully considering the external macro monetary policy and own properties of cognition, Combining internal and external factors to make targeted and rational decision-making behaviors, so as to reduce the financial consequences of management risk preference. On further analysisthe results show that monetary policy can effectively alleviate the promotion effect of management risk preference on debt financing cost; For state-owned enterprises, the impact of management risk appetite on debt financing costs is weaker. After that, the stationarity test of the empirical analysis results was carried out to improve the reliability of the data results. In the end, the research conclusions and policy recommendations and prospects.

 

学位类型硕士
答辩日期2022-05-29
学位授予地点甘肃省兰州市
研究方向财务会计理论与方法
语种中文
论文总页数53
参考文献总数86
馆藏号0004232
保密级别公开
中图分类号F23/721
文献类型学位论文
条目标识符http://ir.lzufe.edu.cn/handle/39EH0E1M/32537
专题会计学院
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
关俊棒. 管理层风险偏好、会计稳健性与债务融资成本[D]. 甘肃省兰州市. 兰州财经大学,2022.
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