会计学院知识库

    新的《证券法》正式规定公司上市由审核制改为注册制，这意味着股票市场的容量进一步扩大。资本市场的发展对于证券分析师的需求增加，2018年我国具备证券投资咨询资质的分析师共计2620人，而最新的2022年中国证监会公示信息显示，分析师的数量增至3441人，增长了31.33%，分析师行业快速发展。风险导向审计告知，审计工作的方方面面都包含风险。风险决策包括两个方面，即审计收费和审计意见。审计收费是连接被审单位与事务所之间绳索，是审计研究绕不开的领域。审计意见类型是审计工作的最终成果，对公司融资和利益相关者决策都会产生影响，是审计研究不可或缺的部分。但是以“第三者”身份的分析师为出发点探究其对审计收费和审计意见的影响的文献目前还不多。 

    基于此，本文选取分析师跟踪这一第三方视角，采用多元回归的方法着重探究分析师跟踪对审计收费和审计意见两方面的影响，并试图引入会计信息透明度和管理者自利行为这两个变量，探究分析师跟踪对审计收费和审计意见的作用机制。研究结果表明：（1）分析师跟踪能显著降低企业的审计收费，分析师跟踪有利于审计师发表标准审计意见；（2）会计信息透明度和管理者自利行为从企业环境和高管行为两方面在分析师跟踪与审计收费及审计意见的关系中发挥中介作用；（3）只有在非国有企业中，分析师跟踪对审计收费的负向影响，有利于发表标准审计意见才表现为显著影响。因此本文认为：分析师作为外部监管的重要力量，应当物尽其用，发挥其对会计信息的解读传递作用，对管理者行为的监督约束作用，并将这种作用拓宽到审计决策中去，降低企业的审计收费，在保证审计质量的前提下，促进标准审计意见的发表，帮助企业提升价值，获得融资，发展壮大。同时，分析师也应加强自身素质建设，监管机构也应注重培养分析师等中介机构，营造良好的环境保护分析师的权益，让分析师更好地为企业、利益相关者等服务。

        The new "Securities Law" stipulates that the listing of companies is officially changed from the examination system to the registration system, means that the capacity of the stock market is further expanded the demand for securities analysts is increasing. In 2018, the number of analysts with securities investment consulting qualifications in China totaled 2,620, while the latest information released by China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2022 shows that the number has increased to 3,441, increasing by 31.33%, indicating the rapid development of the analyst industry.Risk - oriented audit informs that all aspects of audit work contain risks. Risk decision includes two aspects, namely audit fee and audit opinion. Audit fee is a rope connecting the audited unit and the firm, which is an unavoidable field of audit research. Audit opinion is the final outcome of audit work,has an impact on the financing situation and the decision-making of stakeholders, and is an indispensable part of audit research. However,there is not much research on the impact of audit fees and audit opinions from the "third party" between companies and firms.

        Based on this, this article selects analysts trace the third-party perspective, using multiple regression method to explore the analysts tracking to the influence of audit fees and audit opinions from two aspects, and tries to introduce the accounting information transparency and the managerial self-interest behavior of these two variables, analysts trace on the mechanism of action of audit fees and audit opinion. The results shows that:(1) Analyst tracking can significantly reduce audit fees, and it is beneficial for auditors to present standard audit opinions; (2) Accounting information transparency and managers' self-interest play an intermediary role in the relationship between analyst tracking, audit fees and audit opinions from two aspects; (3) Only in non-state-owned enterprises, analyst tracking has a significant impact on audit fees and audit opinions.Therefore, this paper believes that analysts, as an important force of external supervision, should try their best, give play to role in interpreting and transmitting accounting information and supervising and restricting managers' behavior, and broaden this role to the audit decision-making of certified public accountants, reduce the audit fees, so that enterprises can promote the publication of standard audit opinions on the premise of ensuring the audit quality, and help enterprises improve the value and grow.At the same time, analysts should also strengthen their own quality construction, and regulators should also pay attention to the development of intermediary institutions such as analysts, create good rights and interests of environmental protection analysts, so that analysts can better serve enterprises and stakeholders.