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近年来，平台经济领域扼杀型并购在平台经济行业内广泛应用，众多巨头企业出于扩大市场占有率、获取核心技术以及避免未来创新和竞争的考虑，频繁对新兴创业公司实施并购行动。不过，目前的反垄断监管机制在事先申报、过程中审查和事后补救等环节表现出明显的不足，这使得其在应对平台经济领域的此类并购行为时约束力有限。在立法层面，纵使《关于平台经济领域反垄断指南》以及新《反垄断法》中针对平台经济领域扼杀型并购的规制初见雏形，但由于其内容过于笼统，没有形成完整的规制机制。在审查框架层面，仅以营业额为申报标准显得太过单一，无法有效应对平台经济领域的复杂并购行为，可能会导致扼杀型并购规避反垄断审查。此外，平台经济的特性如规模效应、网络效应以及动态竞争等，使得传统的相关市场界定、市场势力评估及竞争损害测量方法逐步失效。与此同时，在事后救济方面传统的结构性救济措施对于高度创新驱动型特性的平台经济并不适用。

首先，本文从平台经济领域扼杀型并购的基本理论出发，通过分析平台经济领域的网络效应、规模效应、动态竞争等特征以及扼杀型并购的特征，与平台经济领域扼杀型并购的类型结合，交代了平台经济领域扼杀型并购规制的理论背景。然后基于平台经济领域扼杀型并购的特征结合经营者集中理论分析出其提高相关市场壁垒、阻碍行业内创新、减少消费者福利等竞争损害属性。与此同时，对平台经济领域扼杀型并购相关的反垄断理论做了详细阐述。

其次，作者认为平台经济领域扼杀型并购可视为经营者集中予以处理，并基于此，交代了平台经济领域扼杀型并购的反垄断规制现状。紧接着从事前申报、事中审查以及事后救济等角度分析我国平台经济领域扼杀型并购反垄断规制面临的困境。在经营者集中认定中，由于平台的跨市场竞争、规模交易等特征使得传统SSNIP方法失灵，导致相关市场难以界定；在经营者集中申报方面，以营业额为标准的申报标准过于单一无法涵盖平台经济领域的多重考量因素，反垄断执法机构主动审查机制方面也存在不足；在认定其垄断性质方面，传统的反事实分析法在平台经济领域的并购行为的垄断性质认定方面面临诸多挑战，主要包括在平台经济中市场占有率的作用弱化、跨市场竞争中竞争关系认定的复杂度提高，以及多重隐私综合影响的消费者福利变化评估难度提高等反面。前述因素都使得平台经济领域企业市场势力的认定变得异常困难。另一方面，在反垄断规制事后救济措施方面，由于动态竞争的影响，传统救济措施的有效性也受到限制，在平台经济领域反垄断规制中难以发挥其应有的作用。

其后，从我国平台经济领域的反垄断规制困境出发，对国外相关立法现状进行阐述。随后针对我国平台经济领域反垄断规制困境，对欧盟、美国、德国等数字经济市场比较成熟发达的国家相关领域的规定，分别从申报标准、审查工具和方法、事后救济等方面进行了分析。其后总结国外相关领域立法现状和效果，从中得出符合我国体制和实际的经验，作为填补我国相关理论及制度方面空缺的参考。

最后，结合前述内容提出完善平台经济领域扼杀型并购反垄断规制的建议举措。在界定“相关市场”方面，提出淡化相关市场的理念，从多个角度将多种因素纳入相关市场界定方法中，将“现在”市场和“未来”市场的影响力也作为考量因素纳入相关市场界定中；在改善现行的申报标准中，重视交易额在申报标准中的作用，以营业额为申报标准的同时引入交易额标准作为补充，并构规定平台的申报义务以及反垄断执法机构的主动审查责任；在竞争损害以及救济方面，在完善竞争损害分析框架的基础上，加入多种影响因子，在传统的救济方式基础上提出适用综合救济方式。

Over the years, killer acquisitions in the field of platform economy have been widely used in the platform economy industry, and many giant enterprises have frequently implemented mergers and acquisitions of emerging startups in order to expand market share, obtain core technologies, and avoid future innovation and competition. However, there are many deficiencies in the current anti-monopoly supervision in terms of ex-ante declaration, ex-ante evaluation, and ex-post relief, resulting in insufficient regulatory power in the face of  killer acquisitions in the field of platform economy. At the legislative level, although the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on the Platform Economy and the new Anti-Monopoly Law have begun to take shape on killer acquisitions in the platform economy sector, they are too general and do not form a complete regulatory mechanism. At the level of the review framework, the reporting standard based on turnover alone is too simple, which cannot effectively deal with complex M&A behaviors in the platform economy field, and may lead to stifling M&A to evade anti-monopoly review. In addition, the characteristics of the platform economy, such as scale effect, network effect and dynamic competition, have made the traditional methods of defining the relevant market, assessing market power and measuring competition damage gradually ineffective. At the same time, in terms of ex post facto relief, traditional structural relief measures are not suitable for the highly innovation-driven platform economy.

Firstly, starting from the basic theory of stifling M&A in the field of platform economy, this paper analyzes the characteristics of network effect, scale effect, dynamic competition and the characteristics of stifling M&A in the field of platform economy, and combines it with the types of stifling M&A in the field of platform economy, and explains the theoretical background of the regulation of stifling M&A in the field of platform economy. Then, based on the characteristics of stifling M&A in the field of platform economy and the theory of concentration of undertakings, the attributes of competition damage such as raising relevant market barriers, hindering innovation in the industry, and reducing consumer welfare are analyzed. At the same time, the anti-monopoly theory related to killer acquisitions in the field of platform economy is elaborated in detail.

Secondly, the author argues that stifling M&A in the field of platform economy can be treated as a concentration of undertakings, and based on this, explains the current situation of anti-monopoly regulation of stifling M&A in the field of platform economy. Then, the dilemma faced by the anti-monopoly regulation of stifling M&A in China's platform economy is analyzed from the perspectives of pre-filing, in-process review and post-event relief. In the determination of concentration of undertakings, due to the cross-market competition of the platform, Large-scale transactions and other characteristics make the traditional SSNIP method dysfunctional, resulting in the difficulty of defining the relevant market; in the declaration of concentration of undertakings, the declaration standard based on turnover is too single to cover multiple considerations in the field of platform economy, and there are also deficiencies in the active review mechanism of anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies; in terms of determining the monopolistic nature of the merger and acquisition in the field of platform economy, the traditional counterfactual analysis method faces many challenges in determining the monopolistic nature of mergers and acquisitions in the field of platform economy, mainly including the weakening of the role of market share in the platform economy, The opposite side is the increasing complexity of the identification of competitive relationships in cross-market competition, and the increasing difficulty of assessing consumer welfare changes due to the comprehensive impact of multiple privacy. All of the above factors make it extremely difficult to identify the market power of enterprises in the field of platform economy. On the other hand, in terms of ex post remedial measures for anti-monopoly regulation, the effectiveness of traditional remedies is also limited due to the impact of dynamic competition, and it is difficult for anti-monopoly regulation to play its due role in the field of platform economy.

Then, starting from the dilemma of anti-monopoly regulation in the field of platform economy in China, the current situation of relevant foreign legislation is expounded. Subsequently, in view of the dilemma of anti-monopoly regulation in the field of platform economy in China, the regulations in relevant fields in countries with relatively mature and developed digital economy markets such as the European Union, the United States, and Germany were analyzed from the aspects of application standards, review tools and methods, and post-event relief. Then, the current situation and effect of foreign legislation in related fields are summarized, and the experience that conforms to China's system and practice is derived, which can be used as a reference to fill the gaps in China's relevant theories and systems.

Finally, based on the above-mentioned contents, some suggestions and measures are put forward to improve the anti-monopoly regulation of killer acquisitions in the field of platform economy. In terms of defining the "relevant market", the concept of diluting the relevant market is proposed, and a variety of factors are incorporated into the relevant market definition method from multiple perspectives, so as to combine the "present" market and the "future" market. The influence of the market is also included as a factor in the definition of the relevant market; in the improvement of the current reporting standards, the role of transaction volume in the reporting standards is emphasized, and the turnover standard is introduced as a supplement while the turnover is used as the reporting standard, and the reporting obligations of the platform and the active review responsibility of the anti-monopoly law enforcement agency are stipulated; in terms of competition injury and remedy, on the basis of improving the analysis framework of competition injury, a variety of influencing factors are added, and the application of comprehensive remedies is proposed on the basis of traditional remedies.