法学院知识库

        近年来，围绕平台生态系统的构建，互联网平台竞争体现出典型的“赢家通吃”特点。大型互联网平台占据市场优势地位后，通过杠杆效应将数据与用户优势跨界传导至其他相邻市场，同时伴随对相邻市场其他竞争者的封禁行为。由于封禁行为与大型互联网平台存在于不同的市场中，反垄断工具在分析相关市场的第一步便产生失范。然而互联网平台封禁行为的危害不容小觑，其对市场竞争秩序与行业创新的损害具有隐蔽性，导致以事后监管为主的反垄断执法模式无法及时对其进行规制，长此以往必然损害消费者利益。

       本文正文主要分为四个部分。第一部分通过对互联网平台封禁行为的内涵与外延界定将研究对象限定为理论与实践界较为认可的不予直链和API封锁两种行为，并对封禁行为造成的扰乱市场公平竞争、阻碍行业创新、损害消费者权利三种竞争损害后果进行分析，以明确反垄断法对互联网平台封禁行为进行规制之必要。第二部分在明确互联网平台封禁行为具有拒绝交易的行为属性后，通过新布兰代斯学派竞争理论、双边市场理论与必需设施理论论述了互联网平台竞争行为的特点、以及反垄断法对其应抱持的规制理念，并从制度与案例两个方面梳理了国内外现行反垄断法框架下对互联网平台封禁行为的规制现状。第三部分总结了当前规制封禁行为存在反垄断分析工具失灵之困境，包括相关市场界定方法失灵、平台支配地位认定困难、违法性衡量标准不明以及监管措施不到位。第四部分针对我国当前立法与执法实践，以传统反垄断工具革新与反垄断新监管工具的引入为两条主线，提出我国规制互联网平台封禁行为的合理路径。针对中国数字经济发展特点构建中国式守门人制度。结合互联网平台竞争特点，增加产品质量、用户数量作为相关市场界定的考量因素，在市场支配地位认定中增加用户多归属、技术创新为考量因素，并在违法性分析中引入比例原则。此外，结合我国当前对互联网平台分级分类的监管趋势，明确反垄断事前监管以大型互联网平台为重点，完善平台自我监管制度，维护公平有序竞争的数字市场。

       In recent years, around the construction of the platform ecosystem, the competition of Internet platforms has reflected the typical "winner-takes-all" characteristics. After a large internet platform occupies a dominant position in the market, it transmits data and user advantages to other adjacent markets through the leverage effect, accompanied by the banning behaviors on other competitors in the adjacent market. Since the banning behaviors exist in a different market from the large Internet platform, the antitrust tool is out of order in the first step of analyzing the relevant market. However, the harm of the banning behavior on Internet platforms should not be underestimated, while its damage to the market competition order and industry innovation is hidden, resulting in the malfunction of the post-event supervision model of anti-monopoly law enforcement to regulate in a timely manner, which will inevitably damage the interests of consumers in the long run.

       The body of this paper is mainly divided into four parts. The first part defines the connotation and extension of the Internet platform blocking behavior to limit the research object to the two behaviors of no direct link and API blocking, which are more recognized by the theory and practice circles, and analyzes three kinds of competitive damages caused by the blocking behavior to disturb the fair competition in the market, impede the innovation of the industry, and reduce the welfare of the consumers, so as to make clear that it is necessary for the anti-monopoly law to regulate the blocking behavior of the Internet platform. In the second part, after clarifying that Internet platform blocking behavior has the behavioral attribute of refusing to trade, the second part discusses the characteristics of Internet platform competitive behavior and the concept of regulation of antitrust law on Internet platform competitive behavior through the competition theory of the New Brandeis School, the theory of bilateral market and the theory of necessary facilities, and compares the regulation status of Internet platform blocking behavior under the framework of the existing antitrust law at home and abroad in terms of system and case law. The third part summarizes the current regulation of blocking behavior of Internet platforms. The third part summarizes the difficulties in the current regulation of blocking behavior due to the failure of antitrust analytical tools, including the failure of relevant market definition methods, the difficulty in determining the dominant position of platforms, the uncertainty in the measurement standard of illegality, and the lack of regulatory measures in place. The forth part proposes a reasonable path for China to regulate Internet platform blocking behavior by taking the innovation of traditional antitrust tools and the introduction of new antitrust regulatory tools as the two main lines in the light of the current legislation and law enforcement practice in China. Constructing a Chinese-style gatekeeper system in light of the development characteristics of China's digital economy. Taking into account the competitive characteristics of Internet platforms, add product quality and number of users as the factors to be considered in defining the relevant market, add multiple user attribution and technological innovation as the factors to be considered in the determination of dominant market position, and introduce the principle of proportionality in the analysis of illegality. In addition, combining with China's current regulatory trend of hierarchical classification of Internet platforms, it is clear that antitrust ex ante supervision focuses on large-scale Internet platforms and improves the platform self-regulation system to maintain a fair and orderly competitive digital market.