法学院知识库

伴随着A股市场的持续低迷，国家进一步降低了上市公司股份回购的门槛，使愈多类型的回购行为被纳入“例外允许”回购的范围中，最大限度给上市公司的股份回购行为松绑，并不断激发这一制度对改善公司经营状况及夯实证券市场基础的重要金融工具价值。回购规模日渐庞大，违规违法回购行为也逐渐增多，此时越需上市公司股份回购监管发力，然而有限的监管资源难以及时应对渐多的违法违规回购行为。

为实现高效监管，必须从制度上健全上市公司股份回购监管制度，保障正当的股份回购行为的同时，惩戒违法违规的股份回购行为。基于此问题导向，在第一部分，明晰了本文的研究目的及意义，全面梳理国内外研究成果并明确了研究方法；第二部分，梳理了上市公司股份回购行为的历史沿革、概念与类型；第三部分，释明了上市公司股份回购监管制度的概念、监管介入的正当性，界分了不同的上市公司股份回购监管模式，并明晰了研究这一论题的理论基础；第四部分，在对上市公司股份回购监管现有规范体系深入检视的基础上，指出上市公司股份回购监管制度建设中宏观上存在监管规范体系化不足问题，微观上存在市场操纵行为认定标准模糊、“忽悠式”回购监管忽视投资者利益问题；第五部分，介绍美国、日本、德国不同上市公司股份回购监管模式下的“安全港”规则，寻求经验启发；第六部分，结合我国上市公司股份回购监管制度建设现状，提出针对性解决方案：其一，明确与完善上市公司股份回购监管制度各基本要素，健全我国上市公司股份回购监管制度体系；其二，引入美国“安全港”规则，使规定情形下的正当股份回购行为不致受到市场操纵审查，赋予其豁免效力，并对“港外”的股份回购行为进行个案认定；其三，建立事前公开承诺制度，重惩“忽悠式”回购行为，保障投资者受损利益。通过健全我国上市公司股份回购监管制度，以充分发挥股份回购制度在上市公司及证券市场发展中的金融工具价值，为证券市场的振兴与长效发展助益。

With the continued downturn in the A-share market, the state has further lowered the threshold for share repurchase of listed companies, so that more types of repurchase behaviors are included in the scope of "exceptionally allowed" repurchases, loosening the restrictions on share repurchase behaviors of listed companies to the greatest extent, and continuously stimulating the value of this system as an important financial instrument for improving the company's operating conditions and consolidating the foundation of the securities market. The scale of repurchase is getting bigger and bigger, and the number of illegal and illegal repurchases is gradually increasing, so it is more and more necessary for the supervision of share repurchases of listed companies, but the limited regulatory resources are difficult to deal with the increasing number of illegal repurchases in a timely manner.

In order to achieve efficient supervision, it is necessary to improve the share repurchase supervision system of listed companies from the institutional perspective, ensure the proper share repurchase behavior, and punish the illegal share repurchase behavior. Based on this problem-oriented, in the first part, the research purpose and significance of this paper are clarified, the research results at home and abroad are comprehensively reviewed, and the research methods are clarified. The second part sorts out the historical evolution, concept and types of share repurchase behavior of listed companies. The third part explains the concept of the share repurchase supervision system of listed companies, the legitimacy of regulatory intervention, delineates different regulatory models of share repurchase of listed companies, and clarifies the theoretical basis for the research on this topic. In the fourth part, on the basis of an in-depth review of the existing regulatory system of share repurchase supervision of listed companies, it is pointed out that there are insufficient systematization of regulatory norms at the macro level in the construction of the share repurchase regulatory system of listed companies, and there are vague identification standards for market manipulation behavior and ignoring the interests of investors in "flickering" repurchase supervision at the micro level. The fifth part introduces the "safe harbor" rules under the regulatory models of share repurchase of listed companies in the United States, Japan and Germany, and seeks inspiration from experience. In the sixth part, combined with the current situation of the construction of the share repurchase regulatory system of listed companies in China, targeted solutions are proposed: first, clarify and improve the basic elements of the share repurchase regulatory system of listed companies, and improve the regulatory system of share repurchase of listed companies in China; Second, the "safe harbor" rule of the United States is introduced to protect legitimate share repurchase behaviors under specified circumstances from market manipulation review, giving them exemption effect, and making individual determinations of share repurchase behaviors outside "safe harbor"; Third, establish a system of prior public commitments, severely punish "flickering" repurchase behaviors, and protect the damaged interests of investors. By improving the share repurchase supervision system of listed companies in China, we will give full play to the value of financial instruments in the development of listed companies and the securities market, and contribute to the revitalization and long-term development of the securities market.