会计学院知识库

        2015年，A股资本市场遭遇了先上涨后直线下落的危机，随着“国家队”机构投资者资金的入场，使遭遇危机的A股资本市场股价回归平稳，恢复了市场流动性。救市使命完成后，投资者曾担忧“国家队”机构投资者会退出资本市场，证监会于当年的第21号公告中明确表示，“国家队”机构投资者将继续发挥其稳定资本市场的重要作用，使各界对“国家队”机构投资者参与上市公司治理寄予了厚望。那么，“国家队”机构投资者长期持股能否在企业微观层面发挥治理效应？又是通过怎样的路径来实现？尚待更多研究结果的验证。

  本文以来自2015-2021年间A股上市公司的18,160个年度观测值为样本，选取大股东掏空行为作为观察视角，针对“国家队”机构投资者持股能否发挥治理效应展开了实证检验。结果表明，“国家队”机构投资者持股能够有效抑制大股东掏空行为，且持股比例越高，治理效应越显著。同时，相对于未被“国家队”机构投资者持股的样本公司，被“国家队”机构投资者持股的公司大股东掏空行为越少。同时，作用机制检验表明，“国家队”机构投资者持股的治理效应主要通过加强内部控制和改善信息环境而达成。进一步研究表明，在非国有、股权制衡度较低及媒体关注度较高的上市公司中，“国家队”机构投资者持股对大股东掏空行为的抑制作用更为显著。

  基于检验结果，本文提出：监管部门应当倡导以“国家队”为代表的机构投资者秉持长期投资观念，主动融入上市公司治理机制的建设中，深度挖掘并充分利用微观公司治理的积极作用；同时，监管部门应鼓励上市公司积极完善内部控制制度，提高信息披露质量，改善内外部信息环境，使“国家队”机构投资者持股更好地发挥对大股东掏空等行为的监督。本文的创新性体现在将“国家队”机构投资者宏观救市的经济后果研究拓展至长期的微观公司治理效应，并丰富了抑制大股东掏空行为的路径选择，且厘清了“国家队”机构投资者持股达成治理效应的作用机理，为缓解第二类代理问题贡献了经验证据和对策启示。

    In 2015, the A-share capital market suffered a crisis that first rose and then plummeted, and with the entry of the "national team" institutional investors, the share price of the A-share capital market suffered a crisis returned to a stable level and restored liquidity. After the completion of the rescue mission, investors were worried that the "national team" institutional investors will withdraw from the capital market, China Securities Regulatory Commission in the 21st Announcement of that year, clearly indicated that the "national team" institutional investors will continue to play a stabilizing role in the capital market, so that all walks of life to the "national team" institutional investors will continue to play a stabilizing role in the capital market. The participation of "national team" institutional investors in the governance of listed companies has raised high expectations. So, can the long-term shareholding of "national team" institutional investors play a governance effect at the micro level of enterprises? And through what path to realize? More studies are needed to verify the results.

    In this paper, we take 18,160 annual observations from A-share listed companies during 2015-2021 as samples, and select the tunneling behavior of major shareholders as the observation perspective, and carry out empirical tests on whether the shareholding of "national team" institutional investors can play a governance effect. The results show that the shareholding of "national team" institutional investors can effectively inhibit the tunneling behavior of major shareholders, and the higher the shareholding ratio, the more significant the governance effect. At the same time, compared with the sample companies that are not held by institutional investors of the "national team", the shareholding of institutional investors of the "national team" is less likely to result in the tunneling behavior of major shareholders. Meanwhile, the mechanism test shows that the governance effect of "national team" institutional investors' shareholding is mainly achieved by strengthening internal control and improving the information environment. Further research shows that the inhibitory effect of shareholding by "national team" institutional investors on the tunneling behavior of major shareholders is more significant in listed companies that are not state-owned, have lower equity checks and balances, and have higher media attention.

    Based on the test results, this paper proposes that: regulators should encourage institutional investors represented by the "national team" to adhere to the long-term investment concept, actively participate in the construction of the governance mechanism of listed companies, and give full play to the effect of governance; at the same time, regulators should encourage listed companies to actively improve the internal control system, enhance the quality of information disclosure, and improve the "internal and external information environment", so as to make the "national team" more effective. At the same time, the regulatory authorities should encourage listed companies to actively improve the internal control system, improve the quality of information disclosure, improve the internal and external information environment, so that the "national team" institutional investors shareholding better play a role in the supervision of the major shareholders to empty and other behaviors. The innovativeness of this paper is reflected in the expansion of the economic consequences of the macro rescue of the "national team" institutional investors to the long-term micro corporate governance effects, and enriched the path to curb the major shareholders' short-selling behavior, and clarified the role mechanism of the "national team" institutional investors to achieve the governance effects of shareholding. It also clarifies the mechanism of the governance effect of "national team" institutional investors' shareholding and contributes empirical evidence and countermeasures to alleviate the second type of agency problem.