高管薪酬激励对企业共同富裕贡献度的影响研究

LZUFE-KMS > 会计学院

作者	薛文雯
姓名汉语拼音	Xue Wenwen
学号	2021000008092
培养单位	兰州财经大学
电话	15393203619
电子邮件	xuewenwen0613@163.com
入学年份	2021-9
学位类别	学术硕士
培养级别	硕士研究生
学科门类	管理学
一级学科名称	工商管理
学科方向	会计学
学科代码	120201
第一导师姓名	邢铭强
第一导师姓名汉语拼音	Xing Mingqiang
第一导师单位	兰州财经大学
第一导师职称	副教授
题名	高管薪酬激励对企业共同富裕贡献度的影响研究
英文题名	Research on the influence of executive compensation incentive on the contribution degree of corporate common prosperity
关键词	高管薪酬激励企业共同富裕贡献度市场竞争地位
外文关键词	Executive compensation incentives ; Corporate common wealth contribution ; Market competitive position
摘要	共同富裕是社会主义的本质要求，是中国式现代化的重要特征。党的十八大以来，中国共产党带领全国各族人民以不畏艰难、艰苦奋斗的精神顺利实现了打赢脱贫攻坚战和全面建成小康社会的目标，为实现全体人民共同富裕奠定了坚实的基础，实现共同富裕成为现阶段全党全国人民向第二个百年奋斗目标迈进的重要任务。企业作为实现共同富裕的重要主体之一，其在社会共同富裕实现过程中作出的贡献对我国全体人民共同富裕远景目标的实现至关重要。高管是企业发展的主心骨，是提高企业共同富裕贡献度的关键要素，但由于信息不对称的存在，高管与股东间存在委托代理问题，为此，高管激励受到了众多企业的关注和运用。那么，对高管进行薪酬激励使高管先富起来后能否促使企业以先富带动后富？为探究这一问题，文章选取高管激励中的薪酬激励方式为研究视角，以 2011-2021年间沪深 A 股上市公司为初始研究样本，采用固定效应面板回归模型实证检验高管薪酬激励对企业共同富裕贡献度的影响及作用机制。文章研究不仅为共同富裕相关话题的探讨提供了企业这一微观新视角，而且对企业完善高管激励机制、增强盈利能力、提高其共同富裕贡献度具有重要的启示意义。文章运用委托代理理论、激励理论、公平分配理论与利益相关者理论对高管薪酬激励与企业共同富裕贡献度的相关关系进行了理论分析，认为在高管与股东间委托代理问题的存在下对高管进行激励可以发挥到一定的激励作用，进而会对企业这一整体产生影响，同时出于公平分配的需要，高管薪酬激励的提高会帮助利益相关者实现物质富裕和精神富裕，从而社会共同富裕程度得以提高，企业会在社会共同富裕实现过程中做出贡献。基于此文章提出高管薪酬激励与企业共同富裕贡献度正相关的研究主假设。文章实证研究结果表明：第一，高管薪酬激励与企业共同富裕贡献度呈正相关关系，对高管进行薪酬激励能有效提高企业共同富裕贡献度。第二，市场竞争地位在高管薪酬激励与企业共同富裕贡献度的正相关关系间存在部分中介效应，即提高市场竞争地位是高管薪酬激励实施以提高企业共同富裕贡献度的路径之一。第三，高管年龄特征发挥着重要调节作用，高管平均年龄正向调节高管薪酬激励与企业共同富裕贡献度的正相关关系。
英文摘要	Common prosperity is an essential requirement of socialism and animportant feature of Chinese-style modernization. Since the 18th CPC National Congress, the CPC has led the Chinese people of all ethnic groups in overcoming difficulties and working hard to achieve the goal of winning the battle against poverty and building a moderately prosperous society in all respects. This has laid a solid foundation for achieving common prosperity for all the people, which has become an important task for the whole Party and the Chinese people as they move toward the second centenary Goal. As one of the important subjects in the realization of common prosperity, the contribution made by enterprises in the realization of common prosperity is of great importance to the realization of the long-term goal of common prosperity for all the people in our country. Senior executives are the backbone of enterprise development and the key factor to improve the contribution to common prosperity of enterprises. However, due to the existence of information asymmetry, there are principal-agent problems between senior executives and shareholders. Therefore, senior executives incentive has attracted the attention and application of many enterprises. Then, can the compensation incentive for senior executives make the executives become rich first and promote the enterprises to become rich later? In order to explore this issue, this paper selects the compensation incentivemethod of executive incentive as the research perspective, takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2021 as the initial research sample, and uses the fixed-effect panel regression model to empirically test the influence of executive compensation incentive on the contribution degree of enterprises' common prosperity and its mechanism. This paper not only provides a new micro perspective for the discussion of common prosperity related topics, but also has important implications for enterprises to improve executive incentive mechanism, enhance profitability, and improve their contribution to common prosperity. This paper uses principal-agent theory, incentive theory, fair distribution theory and stakeholder theory to make a theoretical analysis of the correlation between executive compensation incentive and corporate contribution to common prosperity. It believes that the incentive of senior executives can play a certain incentive role in the presence of the principal-agent problem between executives and shareholders, which will have an impact on the enterprise as a whole. At the same time, due to the need of fair distribution, the improvement of executive compensation incentives will help stakeholders achieve material and spiritual prosperity, so as to improve the level of social common prosperity, and enterprises will make contributions to the realization of social common prosperity. Based on this paper, the main hypothesis of the research is put forward that executive compensation incentive is positively correlated with corporate contribution to common prosperity. The empirical results of this paper show that: First, executive compensation incentive is positively correlated with corporate contribution to common prosperity, and executive compensation incentive can effectively improve corporate contribution to common prosperity. Second, market competitive position has a partial mediating effect on the positive correlation between executive compensation incentive and the contribution of enterprises to common prosperity, that is, improving market competitive position is one of the ways to implement executive compensation incentive to improve the contribution of enterprises to common prosperity. Third, the age characteristics of senior executives play an important moderating role, and the average age of senior executives positively moderates the positive correlation between executive compensation incentives and the contribution to common prosperity of enterprises.
学位类型	硕士
答辩日期	2024-05-26
学位授予地点	甘肃省兰州市
语种	中文
论文总页数	64
参考文献总数	99
馆藏号	0006002
保密级别	公开
中图分类号	F23/1017
文献类型	学位论文
条目标识符	http://ir.lzufe.edu.cn/handle/39EH0E1M/36587
专题	会计学院
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	薛文雯. 高管薪酬激励对企业共同富裕贡献度的影响研究[D]. 甘肃省兰州市. 兰州财经大学,2024.

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