法学院知识库

  数据在数字经济时代是重要的生产投入品，深刻地影响着人们的生产、生活。随着数据驱动型商业模式的兴起，数据的竞争价值开始显露，经营者利用数据取得了巨大的经济利益，囿于经营者自行收集、整理数据需要消耗较大的时间和金钱成本，以集中的方式获取数据，成为了越来越多的企业的选择。近年，数字市场中数据驱动型经营者集中比比皆是，数据驱动型企业之间“合纵连横”更成为一种常态。在数字技术创新、社会应用以及产业发展高歌猛进的同时，因集中行为所产生的限制竞争问题也随之而来。消费者受到产品和服务质量下降、选择减少、创新放缓、隐私数据保护程度降低等损害的情况显而易见，但由于动态竞争的数字市场以及数据驱动型企业的“免费”商业模式、平台经营模式、跨界经营态势，致使适用反垄断法规制数据驱动型经营者集中捉襟见肘，存在价格理论适用困难、SSNIP测试法失灵、企业市场边界模糊、企业的市场份额与市场力量难以度量等问题。

  鉴于此，本文以“数据驱动型经营者集中的竞争损害——数据驱动型经营者集中的反垄断规制的难题——破解数据驱动型经营者集中的规制困难”为线索展开论述。首先，通过分析数据驱动型经营者集中的特质对该类集中进行了界定，并论证了该类集中行为可能造成的竞争损害，揭示了规制数据驱动型经营者集中的必要性。其次，从数据驱动型经营者集中具有的特殊性入手阐述了规制该类经营者集中时现存反垄断规则的不足。最后，结合域外反垄断规制经验，针对规制数据驱动型经营者集中所遇挑战，给出了完善数据驱动型经营者集中反垄断规制的具体建议：第一，界定相关市场时，要结合竞争损害理论，并引入盈利模式测试和产品核心功能测试法来替换SSNIP测试法；第二，认定经营者市场力量时，要将经营者对数据的掌控力和经营者的创新能力作为认定企业力量的要素；第三，针对隐私问题构建了反垄断规制框架；第四，调整申报标准时，引入了交易额标准，给出了适用双重申报标准的具体方法。

In the era of digital economy, data, as an important production input, has a profound impact on people's production and life. Under the data-driven business model, the competitive value of data is becoming increasingly prominent. Data brings huge economic benefits to operators. Due to the large amount of time and money required for operators to collect and sort out data by themselves, more and more operators choose to obtain more quantities and more types of numbers in a centralized way. According to the data advantage and enhance market power. In recent years, the centralized behavior of data-driven operators has frequently appeared in the digital market, and the "verged vertical connection" between data-driven enterprises has become the norm. While digital technology innovation, social application and industrial development are advancing rapidly, the problem of restricting competition caused by centralized behavior has also followed. It is obvious that consumers are harmed by the decline in the quality of products and services, fewer choices, slowing innovation, and reduced privacy data protection, but due to the dynamic competitive digital market and the "free" business model, platform business model and cross-border business situation of data-driven enterprises, anti-monopoly laws and regulations are applied. Data-driven operators are overstretched, and there are problems such as difficulties in applying price theory, failure of SSNIP testing methods, blurred market boundaries of enterprises, and difficult to measure the market share and market forces of enterprises.

In view of this, this paper discusses "the competitive damage and regulation theory of data-driven operator concentration -- the challenge of anti-monopoly regulation of data-driven operator concentration -- the specific content of regulation data-driven operator concentration" as the clue. Firstly, this paper analyzes and summarizes the characteristics of data-driven concentration of managers, as well as the possible competitive damage caused by such concentration behavior, and reveals the necessity of regulating data-driven concentration of managers. Secondly, combined with the characteristics of data-driven operator concentration, the challenges brought by this kind of operator concentration to antitrust regulation are discussed. Finally, combined with the experience of anti-monopoly regulation outside the region, the paper puts forward specific suggestions to improve the anti-monopoly regulation of data-driven operator concentration. First, when defining the relevant market, it should combine the theory of competition injury, and introduce the profit model test and product core function test method to replace the SSNIP test method. Secondly, when determining the market power of the operator, the operator's control over data and the operator's innovation ability should be taken as the factors to determine the enterprise power. Thirdly, it constructs an anti-monopoly regulatory framework for privacy issues. Fourth, when adjusting the declaration standard, the standard of transaction volume is introduced, and the concrete method of applying the double declaration standard is given.