会计学院知识库

随着资本市场的发展，越来越多的中小企业选择在投融资交易中签订对赌协议。对赌协议能够在一定程度上保护投资方的投资利益、激励融资方向好的方向发展。但与此同时，对赌协议引发的一系列问题也不容忽视，某些企业为了获取高额资金，会高估自己的盈利能力，签订与自身发展水平不符的对赌协议。对赌结束后，对赌失败的企业为了避免巨额赔偿和股权流失，会对财务报表进行粉饰或舞弊，这无疑会导致审计工作量加剧，审计难度加大，给审计人员带来一定的风险和挑战。因此，有必要研究对赌协议下的审计风险，为审计人员提出相应的控制措施。

本文从对赌协议下的审计风险形成机制入手，发现对赌协议下审计风险的特殊性主要表现在对赌期限内长线舞弊、对赌信息获取难度大和管理层高压扩张等方面。接着引入新绿股份的案例具体分析，回顾其在对赌协议期间虚增资产、虚增收入和虚假信息披露的行为，以信息不对称理论、信号传递理论和舞弊三角理论为理论基础，依据审计风险模型分析新绿股份财务报表层次的重大错报风险、认定层次的重大错报风险和检查风险，结果表明新绿股份对赌协议下的审计风险主要存在于估值差异、股权失衡、违规披露对赌情况、内部控制失效、收入认定和关联交易方面。另外，会计师事务所风险意识薄弱、风险识别和评估不充分、常规审计程序难以识别企业隐匿的信息和高风险领域审计资源短缺也进一步加剧了审计风险。

因此审计人员在审计过程中要重点评估估值目标设定的合理性，关注企业股权变动情况，审查企业对赌文件信息，测试内部控制有效性，警惕收入指标异常，核查关联方交易真实性。同时，会计师事务所要增强风险意识，依据自身能力承接业务，针对企业实际情况进行全面的风险识别和评估，增加审计程序的不可预见性，根据审计任务分配合理的审计资源以获取充分恰当的审计证据。通过提出上述控制措施以期能够帮助审计人员有效识别对赌协议相关风险。

Along with the evolution of the capital market, more and more small and medium-sized enterprises choose to sign Valuation Adjustment Mechanism in investment and financing transactions.The VAM can protect the interests of investors and encourage the development of financiers to a certain extent. However,at the same time, a series of problems caused by the VAM can not be ignored. In order to obtain high capital, some enterprises will overestimate their profitability and sign a VAM that is inconsistent with its own development level. After the end of the VAM, in order to avoid huge compensation and loss of equity, the enterprises that fail to the VAM will fraud in their financial statements, which will undoubtedly result in increased a large number of audit workload and the difficulty of audit, it brings certain risks and challenges to the auditors. Therefore, it is necessary to study the audit risk under the VAM and put forward the control measures for the auditors.

This paper starts with the formation mechanism of audit risk under the VAM, discusses the particularity of audit risk under the VAM, which is mainly manifested in the long-term fraud within the VAM period, the difficulty in obtaining the VAM information and the high-pressure expansion of the management. Then introduces the specific analysis of the case of New Green Shares to review its behavior of inflating assets, revenues and disclosing false information during VAM, based on Asymmetric Information Theory, Signalling Theorie and Fraud Triangle Theory. According to the audit risk model, this paper analyzes the risk of material misstatement at the financial statement level and the assertion level. It also analyzes the inspection risk. The audit risk under the VAM of New Green Shares  mainly existed in valuation differences, equity imbalance, illegal disclosure the situation of VAM and failure of internal control, the assertion of revenue and related party transactions. In addition, the weak risk awareness of accounting firms, inadequate risk identification and assessment, difficulty in identifying the hidden information of enterprises by routine audit procedures and the shortage of audit resources in high-risk areas also further aggravate the audit risk.

Therefore, in the audit process, auditors should focus on evaluating the reasonableness of the valuation target setting, paying attention to the changes in the equity of the enterprise, reviewing the information of the enterprise's VAM documents, measuring the validity of internal control, alerting the abnormal income indicators, verifying the authenticity of the related party transactions. At the same time, accounting firms should enhance their risk awareness, undertake business according to their own capabilities, conduct comprehensive risk identification and evaluation based on the actual situation of the enterprise, add the unknown of the audit procedures, and allocate reasonable audit resources in the light of the audit tasks to obtain adequate and proper audit evidence. The above control measures are proposed to help auditors effectively identify the risks related to the VAM.