作者戴仁杰
姓名汉语拼音Dairenjie
学号2020000009009
培养单位兰州财经大学
电话13182205727
电子邮件Dairj1998@outlook.com
入学年份2020-9
学位类别学术硕士
培养级别硕士研究生
学科门类管理学
一级学科名称工商管理
学科方向企业管理
学科代码120202
第一导师姓名林艳
第一导师姓名汉语拼音Linyan
第一导师单位兰州财经大学
第一导师职称教授
题名企业虚拟品牌社区利益相关者演化博弈及仿真研究
英文题名Research on the evolution game and simulation of enterprise virtual brand community stakeholders
关键词企业虚拟品牌社区 利益相关者 演化博弈论 仿真分析
外文关键词Enterprise Virtual Brand Community; Stakeholders; Evolutionary Game Theory; Simulation Analysis
摘要

近年来,伴随着数字信息技术的快速普及与发展,越来越多的企业借助创建
虚拟品牌社区的方式来与顾客建立联系,并以此为基础吸引客户参与到公司的新
产品研发、产品回馈等创新活动中。然而,由于网络的匿名性和弱控制性,加上
缺乏统一的企业虚拟品牌社区规范,致使在社区中存在发布不良消息及恶意中伤
等失范行为,从而给企业带来前所未有的负面影响,甚至引发社会矛盾。各群体
间的矛盾与冲突的调和是利益关系协调的内涵,而企业虚拟品牌社区健康发展的
核心便是协调各方的利益关系,因此如何平衡各群体之间的利益关系是促进社区
良性发展的关键。
本研究结合企业虚拟品牌社区实际问题,首先基于利益相关者理论确定企业
虚拟品牌社区利益相关者,其次通过演化博弈理论先后构建“用户-社区管理团
队”、“用户-社区管理团队-企业”两组演化博弈模型,进而通过雅克比矩阵对
各参与主体的策略选择进行稳定性分析,最后根据现实情况对参数进行赋值并运
用 Matlab 软件进行稳定性仿真分析,进一步直观验证各参与主体的演化路径。
研究结果发现:
在双方博弈系统内,社区管理团队消极管理所造成的的损失及对用户的惩罚
和奖励力度会影响双方演化稳定状态;相对于单参数赋值,多参数同时变化可以
显著帮助博弈系统趋于稳定状态。在三方演化博弈系统内,企业的介入在对其他
主体策略选择时起主导作用。各利益群体在进行策略选择时与其所投入的成本呈
正相关关系,且在已知宽松监管会造成声誉损失的前提下,企业可以通过同时不
断调整对社区管理团队奖励和惩罚的力度进而改变用户及社区管理团队的策略
选择,帮助企业虚拟品牌社区最终达成企业严格监管、社区管理团队积极管理,
用户行为规范的最佳理想状态。
通过系统的研究分析,得出的结论有:第一,企业应积极参与到社区的治理
中来,明确社区管理团队的角色职责、管理要求及惩罚措施等,并定期对社区开
展监督管理,保障虚拟品牌社区的有序运行。第二,企业应配合社区管理团队营
造出和谐包容的氛围,优化社区内用户行为规范的激励机制,减少行为失范现象,
使用户不断为社区做出贡献而提高自身在社区内的形象和地位。第三,企业应加强用户对社区的归属感,充分提高顾客参与并改变决策的意识,才能最大化实现
各方利益协调。

英文摘要

In recent years, with the rapid popularization and developmentof digital information technology, more and more enterprises have created virtual brand communities to connect with customers, and onthis basis, attract customers to participate in the company's new product development, product feedback and other innovative activities.However, due to the anonymity and weak control of the network.coupled with the lack of unified corporate virtual brand communitynorms, there are irregular behaviors such as publishing bad news and malicious slander in the community, which brings unprecedentednegative impact to enterprises and even causes social conflicts. The reconciliation of contradictions and conflicts between various groups is the connotation of interest coordination, and the core of the healthy development of the corporate virtual brand community is tocoordinate the interests of all parties, so how to balance the interestrelationship between various groups is the key to promoting the benign development of the community.

Combined with the actual problems of enterprise virtual brandcommunity, this study first determines the stakeholders of the enterprise virtual brand community based on stakeholder theory, and secondly, constructs two sets of evolutionary game models of "user-community margement team” and "wercommunity mrgement team.enterprise” succesively though evo luticrary game theory, and thenmnalyzes the stability of the strateg ie choices of each purtic ipant through the lacobi matrix, and firally assigns the purametess according to the actul situation and uses Matlab sofiware to camy out stability simulation anlysis. Funther visully verify the evolurt ion puth of each purtic ipating entity. The results of the study found:In the twopaty game system, the loes caused by the passivemnngement of the community mangement team and the punishment and rewasd of wsers will affect the evolution and stabil ity of both purties; Compared with s ingle.purameter asignment, simul taneouschanges of mul iple pwameters can significuntly help the gume system to reach a stable state In the tripurtite evolutionury game system, the intervention of enterpries plays a leading role in the choiceof strategies of other subjects. Each interest group is positively correlated with the cost of its investment when making simtegic choices, and under the premise of knowing that looe supervision will enuse reputational damage, enteaprises can change the strategie choicesof wsers and community management teams by contin woudy adjusting the intens ity of rewards and pun ishments for community management teams at the same time, so as to help the enterprise virtul brand community finally achieve the best idenl sate of strict corpommmunity margement team” and "wercommunity mrgement team.enterprise” succesively though evo luticrary game theory, and thenmnalyzes the stability of the strateg ie choices of each purtic ipant through the lacobi matrix, and firally assigns the purametess according to the actul situation and uses Matlab sofiware to camy out stability simulation anlysis. Funther visully verify the evolurt ion puth of each purtic ipating entity. The results of the study found:In the twopaty game system, the loes caused by the passivemnngement of the community mangement team and the punishment and rewasd of wsers will affect the evolution and stabil ity of both purties; Compared with s ingle.purameter asignment, simul taneouschanges of mul iple pwameters can significuntly help the gume system to reach a stable state In the tripurtite evolutionury game system, the intervention of enterpries plays a leading role in the choiceof strategies of other subjects. Each interest group is positively correlated with the cost of its investment when making simtegic choices, and under the premise of knowing that looe supervision will enuse reputational damage, enteaprises can change the strategie choicesof wsers and community management teams by contin woudy adjusting the intens ity of rewards and pun ishments for community management teams at the same time, so as to help the enterprise virtul brand community finally achieve the best idenl sate of strict corpom

学位类型硕士
答辩日期2023-06
学位授予地点甘肃省兰州市
语种中文
论文总页数64
参考文献总数75
馆藏号0004951
保密级别公开
中图分类号F27/201
文献类型学位论文
条目标识符http://ir.lzufe.edu.cn/handle/39EH0E1M/34346
专题工商管理学院
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
戴仁杰. 企业虚拟品牌社区利益相关者演化博弈及仿真研究[D]. 甘肃省兰州市. 兰州财经大学,2023.
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