作者 | 戴仁杰 |
姓名汉语拼音 | Dairenjie |
学号 | 2020000009009 |
培养单位 | 兰州财经大学 |
电话 | 13182205727 |
电子邮件 | Dairj1998@outlook.com |
入学年份 | 2020-9 |
学位类别 | 学术硕士 |
培养级别 | 硕士研究生 |
学科门类 | 管理学 |
一级学科名称 | 工商管理 |
学科方向 | 企业管理 |
学科代码 | 120202 |
第一导师姓名 | 林艳 |
第一导师姓名汉语拼音 | Linyan |
第一导师单位 | 兰州财经大学 |
第一导师职称 | 教授 |
题名 | 企业虚拟品牌社区利益相关者演化博弈及仿真研究 |
英文题名 | Research on the evolution game and simulation of enterprise virtual brand community stakeholders |
关键词 | 企业虚拟品牌社区 利益相关者 演化博弈论 仿真分析 |
外文关键词 | Enterprise Virtual Brand Community; Stakeholders; Evolutionary Game Theory; Simulation Analysis |
摘要 | 近年来,伴随着数字信息技术的快速普及与发展,越来越多的企业借助创建 |
英文摘要 | In recent years, with the rapid popularization and developmentof digital information technology, more and more enterprises have created virtual brand communities to connect with customers, and onthis basis, attract customers to participate in the company's new product development, product feedback and other innovative activities.However, due to the anonymity and weak control of the network.coupled with the lack of unified corporate virtual brand communitynorms, there are irregular behaviors such as publishing bad news and malicious slander in the community, which brings unprecedentednegative impact to enterprises and even causes social conflicts. The reconciliation of contradictions and conflicts between various groups is the connotation of interest coordination, and the core of the healthy development of the corporate virtual brand community is tocoordinate the interests of all parties, so how to balance the interestrelationship between various groups is the key to promoting the benign development of the community. Combined with the actual problems of enterprise virtual brandcommunity, this study first determines the stakeholders of the enterprise virtual brand community based on stakeholder theory, and secondly, constructs two sets of evolutionary game models of "user-community margement team” and "wercommunity mrgement team.enterprise” succesively though evo luticrary game theory, and thenmnalyzes the stability of the strateg ie choices of each purtic ipant through the lacobi matrix, and firally assigns the purametess according to the actul situation and uses Matlab sofiware to camy out stability simulation anlysis. Funther visully verify the evolurt ion puth of each purtic ipating entity. The results of the study found:In the twopaty game system, the loes caused by the passivemnngement of the community mangement team and the punishment and rewasd of wsers will affect the evolution and stabil ity of both purties; Compared with s ingle.purameter asignment, simul taneouschanges of mul iple pwameters can significuntly help the gume system to reach a stable state In the tripurtite evolutionury game system, the intervention of enterpries plays a leading role in the choiceof strategies of other subjects. Each interest group is positively correlated with the cost of its investment when making simtegic choices, and under the premise of knowing that looe supervision will enuse reputational damage, enteaprises can change the strategie choicesof wsers and community management teams by contin woudy adjusting the intens ity of rewards and pun ishments for community management teams at the same time, so as to help the enterprise virtul brand community finally achieve the best idenl sate of strict corpommmunity margement team” and "wercommunity mrgement team.enterprise” succesively though evo luticrary game theory, and thenmnalyzes the stability of the strateg ie choices of each purtic ipant through the lacobi matrix, and firally assigns the purametess according to the actul situation and uses Matlab sofiware to camy out stability simulation anlysis. Funther visully verify the evolurt ion puth of each purtic ipating entity. The results of the study found:In the twopaty game system, the loes caused by the passivemnngement of the community mangement team and the punishment and rewasd of wsers will affect the evolution and stabil ity of both purties; Compared with s ingle.purameter asignment, simul taneouschanges of mul iple pwameters can significuntly help the gume system to reach a stable state In the tripurtite evolutionury game system, the intervention of enterpries plays a leading role in the choiceof strategies of other subjects. Each interest group is positively correlated with the cost of its investment when making simtegic choices, and under the premise of knowing that looe supervision will enuse reputational damage, enteaprises can change the strategie choicesof wsers and community management teams by contin woudy adjusting the intens ity of rewards and pun ishments for community management teams at the same time, so as to help the enterprise virtul brand community finally achieve the best idenl sate of strict corpom |
学位类型 | 硕士 |
答辩日期 | 2023-06 |
学位授予地点 | 甘肃省兰州市 |
语种 | 中文 |
论文总页数 | 64 |
参考文献总数 | 75 |
馆藏号 | 0004951 |
保密级别 | 公开 |
中图分类号 | F27/201 |
文献类型 | 学位论文 |
条目标识符 | http://ir.lzufe.edu.cn/handle/39EH0E1M/34346 |
专题 | 工商管理学院 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | 戴仁杰. 企业虚拟品牌社区利益相关者演化博弈及仿真研究[D]. 甘肃省兰州市. 兰州财经大学,2023. |
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