作者陈再杭
姓名汉语拼音chen zai hang
学号2019000008123
培养单位兰州财经大学
电话15731433819
电子邮件309029986@qq.com
入学年份2019-9
学位类别学术硕士
培养级别硕士研究生
学科门类管理学
一级学科名称工商管理
学科方向会计学
学科代码120201
第一导师姓名袁有赋
第一导师姓名汉语拼音yuan you fu
第一导师单位兰州财经大学
第一导师职称副教授
题名高管持股对企业风险承担的影响:利益趋同效应还是管理防御效应
英文题名The impact of executive stock ownership on corporate risk-taking: Benefit convergence effect or managerial defense effect
关键词高管持股 利益趋同效应 管理防御效应 区间效应 企业风险承担
外文关键词Managerial ownership; Benefit convergence effect; Management defense effect; interval effect; Corporate risk-taking
摘要

  高管持股作为一项激励制度,目的是把高管的利益与企业的业绩和风险紧密的捆绑在一起。通过高管持股的方式,可以促进高管在投资决策方面积极进行风险承担,为企业创造价值,给股东增加财富,同时使自身持有的股权升值。本文基于我国上市公司高管持股以及大股东持股的情况,通过对以往文献进行归纳整理和公司财务指标进行实证分析,以企业风险承担的视角,研究高管持股产生的经济效应。目前存在部分企业风险承担不足,致使长期处于发展低迷状态,或者过度承担风险导致濒临破产边缘。因为高管持有了任职公司的股票,也成为了公司的股东,做出的投资决策对企业的风险承担产生影响。以往的学者大多聚焦在高管持股对于公司绩效和公司价值的影响,鲜有直接涉及以企业风险承担的视角来进行研究。公司提升业绩和增加利润的重要途径之一就是进行投资活动,进行投资活动必然伴随着风险承担。高管作为投资决策的关键人物,由于持有公司的股权,在进行投资活动时进行着风险与收益的考量,研判对其持有股权价值与公司业绩的影响。

  为此,本文以风险承担的视角来研究高管持股所产生的经济效应,选取2015-2019年我国沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究高管持股对于企业风险承担是如何进行影响的,二者之间的关系又将如何变化。研究表明:高管持股与企业风险承担之间具有先上升后下降的倒U型关系。当高管持股低于临界值时,高管持股出现利益趋同效应,使企业风险承担水平提高;当高于临界值时,高管持股出现管理防御效应,使企业风险承担水平降低。考虑在不同的股权集中度下,高管持股对企业风险承担的影响有何区别时,发现股权集中度高的公司,高管持股与企业风险承担的临界值点比低股权集中度的公司的高管持股与企业风险承担的临界值点更为滞后,即高股权集中度的企业的高管持股利益趋同效应区间比低股权集中度的企业的利益趋同效应区间更大。

英文摘要

Administrative shareholding as an incentive system aims to tie the interests of executives to the recital and jeopardies of the company. Through the way of executive shareholding, it can encourage executives to actively take jeopardies in investment decisions, create value for enterprises, increase wealth for shareholders, and appreciate the equity they hold. Based on the shareholding of senior executives and major shareholders of listed companies in China, this paper comportments an empirical analysis of the previous literature and the company's financial indicators, and studies the economic effects of executive shareholding from the perspective of corporate jeopardy bearing. At present, some enterprises have insufficient risk bearing, resulting in a long-term downturn in development, or excessive risk-bearing has led to the brink of impoverishment. Because the executives hold shares in the company they work for and become shareholders in the company, the investment decisions they make have an impression on the risk assumption of the company. Previous scholars mostly focused on the impact of executives' shareholdings on company presentation and company value, and few directly involved research from the perspective of corporate risk-taking. One of the important ways for companies to improve performance and increase profits is to carry out investment activities, and investment activities must be accompanied by risk-taking. As the key person in investment decision-making, executives, because they hold the company's equity, take into account the risks and benefits when conducting investment activities, and study and judge the impact on the value of their equity and company performance.

Therefore, this essay uses the economic effects of executive shareholding from the perspective of risk bearing, picks out 2015 to 2019 as a diagram from China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share itemized companies, and revisions how administrative shareholding affects corporate risk bearing, and how the relationship between the two will change. Essay has made known that there is an overturned U-shaped affiliation between administrative shareholding and company danger assumption, which rises first and then declines. When the senior management shareholding is lower than the critical value, the convergence effect of the interests of the executive shareholding increases the level of enterprise risk bearing; when it is above the critical value, the management defense effect of the executive shareholding decreases the level of enterprise risk bearing. Thinking of the difference between the influence of administrative shareholding on company jeopardy hypothesis under different equity concentrations, it is found that in companies with high equity attentiveness, the lethal value point between administrative shareholding and company jeopardy hypothesis is more lagging behind the critical value point between executive shareholding and enterprise risk assumption in establishments with low evenhandedness attentiveness, that is the convergence effect range of executive shareholding interests of enterprises with high equity concentration is greater than that of enterprises with low equity concentration.

学位类型硕士
答辩日期2022-05-31
学位授予地点甘肃省兰州市
语种中文
论文总页数69
参考文献总数113
馆藏号0004943
保密级别公开
中图分类号F23/859
文献类型学位论文
条目标识符http://ir.lzufe.edu.cn/handle/39EH0E1M/34217
专题会计学院
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
陈再杭. 高管持股对企业风险承担的影响:利益趋同效应还是管理防御效应[D]. 甘肃省兰州市. 兰州财经大学,2022.
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