会计学院知识库

  党的二十大报告指出要“深化国资国企改革，推动国有资本和国有企业做强做优做大”。国有企业作为我国国民经济发展的中坚力量，其在不同历史时期发挥着不同的作用。近年来，管理效率低下、监督与激励机制失效、企业活力不足等问题严重制约了国企实现高质量发展，深化国企改革已成为推动国企健康、可持续发展的主要方向。作为深化国企改革的重要手段，股权激励与国企混改历来相伴而生，探索长效激励约束机制，改善公司治理，激发企业活力一直都是国企改革的重点议题之一。

  文章以中联重科为研究对象，首先对现有文献进行了梳理与总结，并介绍相关理论，为后文分析股权激励实施效果提供理论支撑。其次，对中联重科混改及股权激励过程进行介绍，并采用两方演化博弈模型剖析了其在混改背景下实施股权激励的可行性。再次，使用功效系数法对中联重科股权激励实施前后公司整体绩效及行业地位变化进行分析，并采用纵向对比分析其财务与非财务两方面的变化。最后，对中联重科混改背景下股权激励的实施效果进行总结，并提出经验启示。

  文章采用案例研究法，研究表明中联重科在混改背景下实施股权激励对企业财务效果、非财务效果均产生显著的正向影响。文章有利于丰富股权激励实施效果的相关研究，也有利于为国企在混改背景下实施股权激励提供了理论和案例指导，为进一步深化国企改革提供了方式借鉴。

     The report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China pointed out that we should "deepen the reform of state assets and state-owned enterprises and promote state-owned capital and state-owned enterprises to become stronger, better, and bigger". State-owned enterprises, as the backbone of the development of our national economy, have played different functions in different historical periods. In recent years, problems such as low management efficiency, ineffective supervision and incentive mechanisms, and insufficient enterprise vitality have seriously restricted the realization of high-quality development in state-owned enterprises. Deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises has become the main direction to promote the healthy and sustainable development of state-owned enterprises. As an important means to deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises, equity incentives and mixed reform of state-owned enterprises have always gone hand in hand. Exploring the long-term incentive and restraint mechanisms, improving corporate governance, and stimulating the vitality of enterprises have always been key issues in the reform of state-owned enterprises.

     This paper uses Zoomlion as the research object. Firstly, the existing literature is combed and summarized, and relevant theories are introduced to provide theoretical support for the subsequent analysis of the implementation effect of equity incentives. Secondly, it introduces the process of Zoomlion's mixed reform and equity incentive and uses the two-party evolutionary game model to analyze the feasibility of implementing equity incentive against the background of mixed reform. Thirdly, the efficiency coefficient method is used to analyze the changes in Zoomlion's overall performance and industry status before and after the implementation of the equity incentive, and the longitudinal comparison is used to analyze the financial and non-financial changes. Finally, it summarizes the implementation effect of equity incentives in Zoomlion against the background of mixed reform and puts forward the experience of enlightenment.

     Using the case study method, the research shows that the implementation of equity incentives in Zoomlion against the background of mixed reform has a significant positive impact on both the financial and non-financial results of the enterprise. This paper is conducive to enriching the relevant research on the implementation effect of equity incentives, providing theoretical and case guidance for the implementation of equity incentives in state-owned enterprises against the background of mixed reform, and providing a reference for further deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises.