会计学院知识库

  股权质押是一项有效的融资方式，它以企业股份当作质押物，能够有效地提高资本的使用效率，同时也能够让控制股东在不影响对企业的控制力的情形下，将“经济存量”转化为“经济能力”，从而获取更多的资本。由于股权质押的便利性和低成本，得到了众多中小企业的欢迎。因此，控股股东能够通过股权质押的方式来提前出售所持股份，以便为后续的资金流动提供便利。

  通过对新光圆成公司的案例进行分析，文章从理论和现实两个角度对股权质押的作用机理进行了研究。研究发现，持续的股权质押将造成公司的“两权分离”，而股权质押又能使大公司提前套现，补偿公司的“掏空”成本。文章从三个方面对大公司“掏空”的途径进行了详细的剖析：一是大公司通过股权质押提前获利；其次，他们会将企业的资产转到国外，再加上一些违规担保等操作，最终，企业的抵押出现了问题。在这个案例中，公司内部控制失效，中介机构监管不力，以及社会各界对股权质押行为的忽略，都是造成大股东进行挖空的主要原因。经过对质押新规颁布前后对股权质押的监管标准进行比较，可以看出，法律法规体系的不完善是导致股权质押较高风险的重要原因所在。这种行为不仅给企业带来了极大的损失，也给中小投资者和质权人带来了极大的恶劣影响。

  经过全文深入分析发现，股权质押对大股东掏空动机起到了正向激励的作用，而这也会导致更严重的经济后果，并且受害者人群范围更加宽泛。尽管如此，股权质押并不一定在短期内会对企业产生明确的负面作用。为了防止控股股东滥用权力来实施掏空行为，减少各方损失，本文结合上述原因，对公司内部和外部两个方面提出了有针对性的建议。

  Equity pledge is an effective financing that uses the shares of a company as pledges to improve the efficiency of the use of capital and also allows controlling shareholders to convert "economic stock" into "economic capacity" without affecting the control of the company. It also allows controlling shareholders to convert "economic stock" into "economic capacity" without affecting the control of the company, thereby obtaining more capital. The convenience and low cost of equity pledges have been welcomed by many SMEs. As a result, controlling shareholders are able to sell their shares in advance through equity pledges in order to facilitate subsequent capital flows.

  Through a case study of SKC, this paper explores the mechanism of the impact of share pledges on the emptying of major shareholders. The results show that constant share pledging by firms leads to the separation of two rights, while share pledging can also help large firms cash out early, thus covering the cost of shelling out. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the paths through which large firms engage in shelling out: firstly, they will use share pledges to obtain early returns; secondly, they will transfer company assets through foreign investments, take up company funds and violate guarantees; and finally pledge defaults. In this case, the failure of internal control of the company, the ineffective supervision of intermediaries and the negligence of the community on the share pledging behavior are the reasons for the major shareholders to engage in hollowing out. After comparing the regulatory standards for equity pledges before and after the promulgation of the new regulations on pledges, it is clear that the imperfection of the legal and regulatory system is an important reason for the higher risk of equity pledges. Such behavior has not only brought great losses to enterprises, but also brought great bad effects to small and medium-sized investors and pledgees.

  An in-depth analysis throughout the paper reveals that equity pledges act as a positive incentive for large shareholders to empty their motives, which in turn leads to more serious economic consequences and a broader range of victims. Nevertheless, equity pledges do not necessarily have a clear negative effect on firms in the short term. In order to prevent controlling shareholders from abusing their power to commit short-selling and to reduce losses for all parties, this paper combines the above-mentioned reasons with targeted recommendations for both internal and external aspects of the company.