会计学院知识库

上市公司信息披露是利益相关者获取企业信息的重要渠道，同时也是促进资本市场健康发展的核心要素。企业如果想得到高质量发展和在未来的科技创新转型中取得优势，就必然要求其进一步地提升自身的信息披露质量。但由于我国特殊的制度环境和公司内部治理能力的有限，上市公司长期以来一直存在信息披露质量较低的问题。近年来，我国上市公司信息披露丑闻频现，一些公司通过非法手段获取短期高额利益最终受到证监会的处罚。这种行为不但侵害了外部投资者的利益，还在一定程度上损害了企业形象，不利于企业未来发展。董事会的监督和咨询职能引导公司行为并发挥治理效应，从而对企业的信息披露质量产生影响。董事会非正式层级是由董事会成员之间社会资本和声誉的差异所形成的非正式制度，董事会成员通过合作互动对彼此加深了解从而形成关系契约对公司治理产生影响。当前关于董事会对于企业信息披露质量的研究大多聚焦于董事会正式制度的作用，而关于非正式制度对于信息披露质量的影响研究较少。因此本文将董事会非正式层级与企业信息披露质量建立联系对其之间的关系进行深入研究。

文章选取2011—2020年深市A股上市公司作为研究样本，基于资源依赖理论、关系契约理论、信息不对称理论和委托代理理论来探讨董事会非正式层级、内部控制质量和信息披露质量三者之间的关系，并将董事长是否处于最高层级和市场化程度发挥的调节作用纳入研究，最终得出以下结论：董事会非正式层级可以提高企业的信息披露质量且内部控制在其中发挥了中介作用，即董事会非正式层级可以通过提高公司的内部控制水平从而对信息披露质量产生影响；董事长是否位于最高层级在董事会非正式层级和企业信息披露质量中发挥调节作用，即相对于董事长处于最高层级，当董事长处于较低层级时董事会非正式层级对信息披露质量的促进作用更为显著；市场化程度在董事会非正式层级和企业信息披露质量中发挥调节作用，即相对于处于市场化程度较高地区的企业，董事会非正式层级对处于较低市场化程度区域企业的信息披露质量的正向作用更加显著。通过以上研究结论，本文为企业降低信息不对称，保护中小股东以及外部投资者的利益提供相关建议；为市场监管者制定合理的企业信息披露政策提供了一定检验证据。

Information disclosure by publicly traded companies is an important channel for stakeholders to access corporate information and is also a central element in promoting the healthy development of the capital market. If companies want to achieve high-quality development and gain advantages in the future transformation of science and technological innovation, they will be required to further improve the quality of their information disclosure. However, due to China's special institutional environment and limited internal corporate governance capacity, listed companies have long had the problem of low-quality information disclosure. In recent years, disclosure scandals of listed companies in China have frequently emerged and some companies have been punished by the Securities Regulatory Commission for making high short-term profits through illegal means. Such behavior not only infringes on the interests of outside investors, but also damages the company's image to some extent, to the detriment of its future development. The supervisory and advisory functions of the board of directors guide corporate behavior to exert a governance effect and thus have an impact on the quality of corporate disclosure. The informal board hierarchy is an informal system formed by differences in social capital and reputation among board members, who interact cooperatively to gain a better understanding of each other and thus form a relational contract that has an impact on corporate governance. Most current research on the role of the board of directors on corporate disclosure quality focuses on the role of the formal board system, but less on the impact of the informal system on disclosure quality. Therefore, this paper links the informal board hierarchy to corporate disclosure quality and examines the relationship between them in depth.

The paper selects Shenzhen listed companies from 2011 to 2020 as the research sample, based on resource dependence theory, relational contract theory, information asymmetry theory and principal agent theory to explore the relationship between informal board hierarchy, internal control quality and disclosure quality, and incorporates the moderating role played by whether the chairman is at the highest level and the degree of marketization. The study concludes that the informal level of the board of directors can improve disclosure quality and that internal control plays a mediating role, that is, the informal level of the board of directors can have an impact on disclosure quality by improving the level of internal control in the company. Whether the chairman is at the top level plays a moderating role on the level of informal board and corporate disclosure quality, i.e., the level of informal board has a more significant effect on the disclosure quality of companies with a lower chairman than those with a higher level chairman; the degree of commercialization plays a moderating role on the level of informal board and corporate disclosure quality, i.e., the level of informal board has a more significant effect on the disclosure quality of companies with a lower chairman than those with a higher degree of commercialization. The positive effect of informal board hierarchy on the disclosure quality of firms in less market-oriented regions is more pronounced than that of firms in more market-oriented regions. Through the above findings, this paper provides suggestions to reduce information asymmetry and protect the interests of small and medium shareholders and outside investors, and provides some test evidence for market regulators to formulate reasonable corporate disclosure policies.