金融学院知识库

  As a common financing method in the capital market, equity pledge not only has high efficiency and low cost, but also can help the controlling shareholder obtain the required cash flow without transferring the controlling shareholder's control over the enterprise. Therefore, financing through equity pledge once attracted the attention of many controlling shareholders in the capital market. Become one of the important financing channels for controlling shareholders. However, since 2015, with the increase of the scale of equity pledge, the "thunder" of equity pledge, stock price crash and other phenomena emerge one after another, which brings great impact on the stable development of Chinese capital market. In the capital market, the risk of stock price collapse caused by moral hazard and disclosure problems can be effectively restrained by regulation to a large extent. Therefore, from the perspective of the regulatory environment, this paper discusses whether the change of the regulatory environment will have an impact on the stock price crash caused by the equity pledge of the controlling shareholder.

  According to the research topic of this paper, the relevant literature is firstly sorted out, and the research hypothesis of this paper is proposed along with the relevant theoretical basis. Then, by analyzing the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2013 to 2020，This paper studies the relationship between the shareholding pledge of controlling shareholders and the risk of stock price crash, and introduces an intermediate variable between the two -- regulatory environment to further study the influence of the tightness of regulatory environment on the shareholding pledge of controlling shareholders, and finally analyzes and discusses the research results. Finally, corresponding measures and suggestions are put forward according to the conclusions, and the shortcomings of this paper are summarized.

  The results show that the risk of stock price collapse will increase when the controlling shareholder carries out equity pledge financing. Controlling shareholders will infringe on the interests of minority shareholders through information manipulation. External supervision can effectively reduce this moral hazard and thus reduce the possibility of stock price crash risk. However, an overly cautious regulatory attitude will also convey a more negative sentiment to the market, making investors lack confidence in the market, thus leading to the risk of stock price collapse. This paper enriched the research results on the relationship between equity pledge and stock price crash risk, and from the perspective of regulatory environment, provided a new basis for research on equity pledge risk caused by controlling shareholders.