法学院知识库

作为维护金融安全的重要手段，金融监管有效才能维护金融市场的安全与稳定。当前，我国的金融监管体制改革主要包括两个方面：横向与纵向。在中央层面，金融监管改革已取得初步进展与一定成效，而地方层面区域性风险频发，亟需进行改革以促进地方金融监管权的合理配置。这就对我们提出了更高要求，既要求中央层面坚持宏观审慎监管原则，强化系统性风险防范职责，也要求地方政府在坚持中央主导的前提下，发挥主观能动性，积极防范与应对地方金融风险，从而形成中央与地方双层金融监管模式。

本文以金融监管的正当性理论、中央与地方分权理论、中央与地方金融监管竞争理论为支撑。通过规范分析、跨学科分析、历史分析与实证分析的方法，研究双层金融监管模式的构建过程中，中央与地方金融监管权配置存在的法律问题。其一，中央金融监管法律供给缺位，地方金融监管依据与内容均存在合法性缺陷；其二，中央与地方金融监管权责边界不明；其三，地方金融监管立法存在较大差异，监管对象不统一、监管职能不平衡、协调机制不完善，且没有较为系统的法律体系对其规范。

围绕上述问题，本文拟对中央与地方金融监管权配置的法治化路径选择提出建议。首先，在中央层面明确地方金融监管权的合法性来源，包括合法性地位、监管依据、监管内容的合法性；其次，厘清中央与地方金融监管权责边界，在坚持中央主导的原则下，赋予地方与监管责任相统一的监管权；最后，完善地方金融监管法律制度，明确地方金融监管范围，并通过行为监管的方式实现地方金融监管过渡。同时，在立法中明确地方金融监管部门的监管职责与服务发展职责，实现二者的平衡，通过更为完善的中央与地方金融监管协调机制，推进中央与地方金融的协同监管。

As an important means of maintaining financial security, effective financial regulation is necessary to maintain the safety and stability of financial markets. At present, the reform of China's financial regulatory system consists of two main aspects: horizontal and vertical. At the central level, financial regulatory reform has made initial progress and achieved certain results, while at the local level, regional risks are frequent and reforms are urgently needed to promote a rational allocation of local financial regulatory powers. This has put forward higher requirements for us, requiring the central government to adhere to the principle of macro-prudential supervision and strengthen its responsibility for systemic risk prevention, while also requiring local governments to play an active role in preventing and responding to local financial risks while adhering to the premise of central leadership, thus forming a two-tier financial supervision model between the central and local levels.

This paper is supported by the legitimacy theory of financial regulation, the theory of central-local decentralisation and the theory of competition between central and local financial regulation. Through the methods of normative analysis, interdisciplinary analysis, historical analysis and empirical analysis, the legal problems in the allocation of central and local financial regulatory powers in the process of constructing the two-tier financial regulatory model are studied. Firstly, there is a lack of legal supply of central financial supervision, and the basis and content of local financial supervision are legally deficient; Secondly, the boundary between central and local financial supervision authority and responsibility is unclear; Thirdly, there is a large difference in local financial supervision legislation, the objects of supervision are not uniform, the supervisory functions are not balanced, the coordination mechanism is not perfect, and there is no more systematic legal system to regulate them.

With regard to the above-mentioned problems, this paper intends to make suggestions on the path of rule of law for the allocation of central and local financial regulatory powers. Firstly, to clarify the source of legality of local financial regulatory power at the central level, including the status of legality, the basis for regulation and the legality of regulatory content; Secondly, to clarify the boundary between central and local financial regulatory power and responsibilities, and to give localities regulatory power that is consistent with regulatory responsibilities while adhering to the principle of central leadership; Thirdly, to improve the legal system of local financial regulation, and to realize the transition of local financial regulation by way of behavioural regulation, and to clarify in the legislation the regulatory responsibilities of local financial regulatory authorities and their responsibilities to serve development, to achieve a balance between the two, and to promote synergistic regulation of central and local finance through a more complete coordination mechanism between central and local financial regulation.