会计学院知识库

   “十四五”时期，我国经济转向高质量发展阶段，经济建设也迈向新征程。国有企业在立足“两个大局”的出发点上，其发展质量和经营存续关系到整个国家的经济社会发展。在此过程中，国有企业因其自身的产权特征和一定的政治关联，相较于民营企业在债务融资方面具有独特的优势，这会在一定程度上降低国企的债务融资成本，进而导致国有企业的负债水平较高。从宏观角度来看，过高的债务水平可能会增加国企破产风险和股价崩盘风险，带来整个国民经济和金融市场的不稳定；从微观角度来看，对于国企自身而言，债务负担过重会使企业陷入财务困境，进而影响其自身保值增值和未来发展水平。

  自十八届三中全会以来，我国在积极推进“混合所有制经济改革”的道路上不断探索前进。企业风险防范是管理会计领域中一项至关重要的环节。在“混改”的背景下，通过引入非国有股东进行治理，改善国企股权结构和资本结构，优化激励机制，突出企业主业，提高企业效率和盈利能力进而激发企业市场活力，这在一定程度上可以缓解我国国企现存产能过剩、负债水平高和债务违约风险大等问题。

  本文以2014年-2020年我国沪深A股上市公司为研究样本，通过构建多元回归模型，深入研究了非国有股东治理对国有企业债务违约风险的影响，并基于委托代理理论对上述影响机制进行了直接检验，从内部控制质量和预算软约束两个视角对作用机理进行了间接检验，进而对研究结论进行稳健性检验。研究结论表明：国有企业通过引入非国有股东治理能够降低债务违约的风险；通过路径研究发现，内部控制质量是非国有股东治理影响国企债务违约风险的内部机理，预算软约束是非国有股东治理影响国企债务违约风险的外部机制。同时根据研究结论提出以下政策建议：第一，立足时代背景，进一步深化国企改革；第二，非国有股东要权责结合，形成高质量的“混”和“改”发展合力；第三，通过非国有股东治理提高内部控制质量，更好融合市场发展；第四，政府应减少对国企的干预，硬化预算软约束，充分发挥市场机制。

  During the 14th Five-Year Plan period, China's economy turned into a stage of high-quality development and embarked on a new journey of economic development.Based on the "two overall situation", the development quality and operation survival of state-owned enterprises（SOEs） are related to the economic and social development of the whole country.In this process.State-owned enterprises have unique advantages in debt financing compared with private enterprises due to their property rights characteristics and certain political connections,which will reduce the debt financing cost of SOEs to a certain extent, which may lead to a higher debt level of SOEs.From the macro point of view, excessive debt level may increase the risk of bankruptcy of state-owned enterprises and stock price crash, and bring instability to the whole national economy and financial market.From the micro point of view, for state-owned enterprises themselves, excessive debt burden will cause enterprises to fall into financial difficulties, and then affect their own value preservation and increase and future development level.

  Since the third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, China has been actively promoting the "mixed ownership economic reform".Enterprise risk prevention is a crucial link in the field of management accounting.Under the background of "mixed reform", non-state-owned shareholders are introduced for governance, the ownership structure and capital structure of state-owned enterprises are improved, the incentive mechanism is optimized, the main business of enterprises is highlighted, the efficiency and profitability of enterprises are improved, and the market vitality of enterprises is stimulated.To some extent, this can alleviate the existing problems of overcapacity, high debt level and debt default risk of China's state-owned enterprises.

  This paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in China from 2014 to 2020 as research samples. By constructing multiple regression model, this paper deeply studies the influence of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the debt default risk of state-owned enterprises.Based on principal-agent theory, this paper directly tests the above influencing mechanism and indirectly tests the mechanism from the perspectives of internal control quality and budget soft constraint.The results were tested for robustness. The results show that the introduction of non-state-owned shareholder governance can reduce the risk of debt default;Through path research, it is found that internal control quality is the internal mechanism of non-state-owned shareholder governance affecting SOEs debt default risk, and budget soft constraint is the external mechanism of non-state-owned shareholder governance affecting SOEs debt default risk.At the same time, according to the research conclusions, the following policy suggestions are put forward: first, based on the background of The Times, further deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises; Second, the rights and responsibilities of non-state-owned shareholders should be combined to form high-quality development forces for "mixing" and "reforming". Third, improve the quality of internal control through governance of non-state-owned shareholders and better integrate market development; Fourth, the government should reduce intervention in state-owned enterprises, harden soft budget constraints, and give full play to the market mechanism.