法学院知识库

互联网平台经济背景下，平台企业通过集中并购获取数据资源强化其市场力量的现象屡见不鲜。平台集中在一定程度上能够优化资源供给，提高资源配置效益实现规模化经营，然而，双边或多边市场下的平台企业具有网络外部性、免费模式、数据集中度高等特征，以及普遍存在严重的“掐尖式”并购问题，当下的经营者集中规制制度面临挑战。因此，本文试图结合平台企业新特征，着重关注双边市场、数据聚合和消费者隐私保护等因素，分析平台企业经营者集中反垄断规制存在的不足，并提出规制平台企业经营者集中的相关建议。

首先，本文从平台企业经营者集中的基本理论出发，界定了平台企业的概念，并分析平台企业具有网络外部性、免费模式等特点。然后基于数据资源的重要性总结出平台企业经营者集中行为的含义。此外，对规制平台企业经营者集中的理论基础和必要性作了介绍，在平台经济领域强化监管的趋势下，需要综合运用结构主义和行为主义规制理念。互联网平台企业跨市场竞争、垄断问题频发要求我们在反垄断制度上做出必要的回应。

其次，从经营者集中反垄断规制程序的角度，分析了平台企业经营者集中规制的难点。在市场界定方面，“产品界定”问题受到忽视、免费模式使SSNIP方法失灵；经营者集中申报标准方面，受到免费定价模式的冲击和掐尖式并购的挑战；集中竞争效果分析框架上，市场份额作用弱化、跨市场竞争和市场壁垒等因素影响市场力量认定，同时数据封锁和侵犯消费者隐私行为也加大了评估的难度；在经营者集中救济措施方面，受动态竞争影响，救济措施实施比较困难。

再次，对包括欧盟、美国和日本在内的域外国家关于平台企业经营者集中法律规制的相关案例与司法实践作了梳理研究，结合域外经验分析从中获得的启示，为我国相关理论制度的完善提供借鉴。

最后，提出规制平台企业经营者集中的相关建议。在界定“相关市场”上，首先要明确“产品界定”标准，然后采用替代分析方法界定相关市场；完善申报标准方面，在营业额标准基础上引入交易额，并构建分类分级审查机制；经营者集中竞争效果分析框架的完善上，考虑数据对市场力量的影响，依据平台类型差别评估其市场力量，同时从平台企业行为的角度分析实施数据封锁协同行为的动机、能力并重视消费者隐私权益的保护；救济制度完善方面，要精准适用结构性和行为性救济措施，同时构建可追踪性的事后监管制度，形成事前加事后的协同监管局面。

In the context of the Internet platform economy, t it is not uncommon for platform companies to acquire data resources through centralized mergers and acquisitions to strengthen their market power. To a certain extent, the platform concentration can optimize the supply of resources, improve the efficiency of resource allocation, and realize large-scale operation. However, Platform companies in bilateral or multilateral markets have the characteristics of network externalities, free models, high data concentration, and widespread serious "pinching-type" mergers and acquisitions. The current regulatory system for the concentration of operators is facing challenges. Therefore, this paper attempts to combine the new characteristics of platform enterprises, focusing on factors such as bilateral market, data aggregation and consumer privacy protection, analyzes the shortcomings of anti-monopoly regulation on the concentration of platform business operators, and puts forward relevant suggestions for regulating the concentration of platform business operators.

Firstly, starting from the basic theory of operator concentration of platform enterprises, this paper defines the concept of platform enterprises, and analyzes the characteristics of platform enterprises such as network externality and free mode. Then, based on the importance of data resources, the meaning of the concentration behavior of platform enterprise operators is summarized. In addition, the theoretical basis and necessity of regulating the concentration of platform business operators are introduced. Under the trend of strengthening supervision in the field of platform economy, it is necessary to comprehensively use the regulatory concepts of structuralism and behaviorism. The frequent cross-market competition and monopoly issues of Internet platform companies require us to make necessary responses to the anti-monopoly system.

Secondly, from the perspective of the anti-monopoly regulatory procedures for the concentration of operators, i it analyzes the difficulties in the regulation of the concentration of operators in platform enterprises. In terms of market definition, the issue of "product definition" is ignored, and the free model makes the SSNIP method ineffective; In terms of reporting standards for concentration of business operators, it is impacted by the free pricing model and challenged by sharp-edged mergers and acquisitions; in the analysis framework of the effect of concentrated competition, factors such as the weakening of market share, cross-market competition and market barriers affect the determination of market power. At the same time, data blocking coordination behavior and consumer privacy violations also increase the difficulty of evaluation; In terms of the relief measures for the concentration of operators, due to the influence of dynamic competition, it is difficult to implement the relief measures.

Thirdly, it sorts out the relevant cases and judicial practice of the legal regulation of the concentration of platform business operators in foreign countries including the European Union, the United States and Japan, and analyzes the enlightenment obtained from the analysis of the foreign experience, which is helpful for the improvement of relevant theoretical systems in China.

Finally, it puts forward relevant suggestions for regulating the concentration of operators of platform enterprises. In defining the "relevant market", the "product definition" standard must be clarified first, and then an alternative analysis method should be used to define the relevant market; in terms of improving the reporting standard, the transaction volume standard shall be introduced on the basis of the turnover standard, and a classification and grading review mechanism is established; In the improvement of the analysis framework of the competition effect of the concentration of operators, consider the impact of data on market power, evaluate their market power according to the difference of platform types, Meanwhile , from the perspective of platform enterprise behavior analyze the motivation and ability of implementing data blocking collaborative behavior, and pay attention to the protection of consumer privacy rights; in the improvement of the relief system, it is necessary to accurately apply structural and behavioral relief measures, and at the same time build a traceable post-event supervision system to form a pre-event and post-event collaborative supervision situation.