会计学院知识库

高质量的会计信息可以清晰地反映企业的财务状况与经营成果，并且有利于投资者预测企业未来的发展前景。会计信息因此成为财务报表使用者评价企业生产经营状况、评估企业真实价值和进行资源合理配置的重要依据。但是，企业往往会为了虚增业绩而操纵会计信息，这样就降低了会计信息的质量。根据高层梯队理论，高管负责管理企业的日常经营活动，其做出的决策会对公司产生重要影响，因此高管身上具备的特征必然会影响会计信息的质量。那么，学术经历作为高管的一种特殊背景，能否影响会计信息质量以及如何影响会计信息质量？现有研究的文献较少。

本文以2009年—2020年中国A股数据作为研究样本，建立面板FGLS模型，系统考察了公司高管学术经历如何通过管理层的在职消费率、资产利用率等代理成本衡量指标对会计信息质量产生影响。同时，通过选择不同年份的数据样本、替换自变量和因变量以及内生性检验的方法对结果进行稳健性检验。得出结论如下：公司聘用有学术经历的高管，可以通过代理成本的降低——提高资产利用率，改善公司会计信息质量。进一步分析发现：有学术经历的高管在改善公司会计信息质量方面的意愿也会受到企业自利动机的影响，从而会影响到公司会计信息，当为非国有企业、公司内部业绩压力较小、外部监督较弱时，公司高管的个人利己主义的动机会降低，对公司会计信息的质量的改善效应就更为显著。

深入研究高管学术经历与会计信息质量之间的关联，本文充实了关于会计信息质量影响因素的相关文献，同时也从代理成本和会计信息质量视角延伸了对高管学术经历经济后果的理解，丰富了委托代理理论与烙印理论，并为投资者做出合理的投资决策和提高企业信息质量提供有益的参考建议。

High quality accounting information can clearly reflect the financial status and operating results of an enterprise, and help investors predict the future development prospects of the enterprise. Therefore, accounting information has become an important basis for users of financial statements to evaluate the production and operation of enterprises, evaluate the true value of enterprises and reasonably allocate resources. However, enterprises often manipulate accounting information in order to falsely increase performance, which reduces the quality of accounting information. According to the high echelon theory, senior executives are responsible for the daily operation and management activities of the enterprise, and their decisions will have an important impact on the company, so the characteristics of senior executives will inevitably affect the quality of accounting information. So, as a special background of senior executives, can academic experience affect the quality of accounting information and how? The existing research literature is less.

This paper takes the data of China's a shares from 2009 to 2020 as the research sample, establishes a panel FGLS model, and systematically investigates how the academic experience of senior executives affects the quality of accounting information through the agency cost measurement indicators such as the on-the-job consumption rate and asset utilization rate of the management. At the same time, by selecting data samples in different years, substituting independent variables and dependent variables, the endogenous test method is used to test the robustness of the results. The conclusions are as follows: the company can improve the quality of accounting information by reducing agency costs by employing senior managers with academic experience. Further analysis shows that: the willingness of senior executives with academic experience to improve the quality of corporate accounting information will also be affected by corporate self-interest motivation, which will affect the corporate accounting information. When they are non-state-owned enterprises, the internal performance pressure of the company is small, and the external supervision is weak, the motivation of personal self-interest of senior managers of the company will be reduced, and the improvement effect on the quality of corporate accounting information will be more obvious.

This paper makes an in-depth study on the relationship between senior executives' academic experience and accounting information quality. This paper enriches the relevant literature on the influencing factors of accounting information quality, extends the understanding of the economic consequences of senior executives' academic experience from the perspective of agency cost and accounting information quality, enriches the principal-agent theory and branding theory, and provides useful reference suggestions for investors to make reasonable investment decisions and improve enterprise information quality.