会计学院知识库

    在信息化、智能化席卷全球的大背景下，我国早已将提升创新能力放到国家战略发展的重要地位，而这一目标的实现离不开微观企业的助力。管理者作为企业的直接决策者，其风险偏好会直接影响到企业是否进行高风险研发投资，因而通过相应的方式激励决策者转变对风险的态度、重视研发创新就显得格外重要。近些年企业实践中不断涌现超额薪酬的激励方式，引发各国学者及政府对其影响因素和经济后果的关注和讨论。针对超额薪酬的管理层权力观的兴起是否意味着最优契约理论已经失效？超额薪酬的激励如何作用于高管的决策行为？这是本文研究的出发点和落脚点，也是社会各界针对公司治理讨论的热门话题。

    本文沿着“激励政策→心理偏好→决策行为”的逻辑体系，运用理论与实证相结合的方法，首先梳理了相关国内外文献，接着在理论分析的基础上提出研究假设并建立回归模型，然后以2014—2019年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本，结合实证研究方法得出研究结论：（1）高管超额薪酬能显著增强高管的研发投资积极性，激励高管作出增加企业研发投入的决策；（2）通过中介效应检验发现，管理者风险偏好在高管超额薪酬作用于企业研发投入的路径中发挥了部分中介作用；（3）不同产权性质下，高管超额薪酬作用于企业研发投入的传导路径有所差异，相比于非国有企业，超额薪酬对国有企业高管的激励效果更加明显，能够显著改变其对待风险的态度，进而作出高风险研发投资决策。

    最后，本文从政府和企业两个角度出发，为提升企业创新水平提出了几点对策建议：政府层面应当增强对企业研发创新的引导作用和支持力度，营造鼓励创新的社会氛围和公平的市场环境；企业层面应当完善薪酬激励体系，优化人力资源配置和人才培养机制，发挥人才对提升企业创新水平的引领和带动作用。

     In the context of informatization and intelligence sweeping the world,my country has long placed the promotion of innovation capabilities in an important position of national strategic development,and the realization of this goal cannot be achieved without the help of micro-enterprises.As the direct decision maker of an enterprise, the risk preference of managers will directly affect whether the enterprise makes high-risk R&D investments.Therefore,it is particularly important to encourage decision makers to change their attitudes towards risk and attach importance to R&D innovation through corresponding methods. In recent years,incentives for excess salaries have continuously emerged in corporate practice,causing scholars and governments from various countries to pay attention to and discuss its influencing factors and economic consequences.Does the rise of management's view of power for excess salaries mean that the theory of effective contracts has expired?How does the incentive of excess compensation affect the decision-making behavior of executives?This is the starting point and end of the research of this article,and it is also a hot topic in the discussion of corporate governance from all walks of life.

      This paper follows the logic system of “incentive policy → psychological preference → decision-making behavior”,using the method of combining theory and empirical research, first combing the relevant domestic and foreign literature, and then proposing research hypotheses and establishing regression models on the basis of theoretical analysis,and then Taking the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2019 as the research sample,combined with empirical research methods,the research conclusions are drawn:(1)Excessive compensation of executives can significantly enhance the enthusiasm of executives for R&D investment and encourage them to increase R&D investment in enterprises;(2) Through the mediation effect test,it is found that managers’ risk appetite plays a part of the mediating role in the path of executives’ excess compensation to corporate R&D investment;(3)Under the nature of different property rights,executives’ excess compensation plays a role in corporate R&D The transmission path of investment is different.Compared with non-state-owned enterprises,the incentive effect of excess compensation on the executives of state-owned enterprises is more obvious,which can significantly change their attitudes towards risks and make high-risk R&D investment decisions.

      Finally,from the perspectives of the government and the enterprise,this article puts forward several countermeasures and suggestions for improving the level of enterprise innovation:The government should strengthen the guiding role and support for enterprise R&D and innovation,and create a social atmosphere that encourages innovation and fairness.Market environment:The enterprise level should improve the salary incentive system,optimize the allocation of human resources and the talent training mechanism,and give full play to the leading and leading role of talents in enhancing the innovation level of the enterprise.