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  低效甚至无效的投资难以成为企业高效率发展的支撑，如何提高投资效率，优化资源配置成为企业发展经营过程中亟需解决的问题。而高管作为直接参与企业生产经营过程中的重要角色，决定着企业的资源分配、研发规划、投资选择等关键事项。近年来，高管薪酬涨幅不断攀升，同行业内高管薪酬水平差异大，但由于对高管行为的机制约束和监管措施有限，高管收入不公平现象不但未能得到缓解，甚至引致了公司治理不畅等矛盾，高管的管理行为有时背离公司既定的发展目标。同时，更多的研究成果如行为金融学、实验经济学等证实，非理性特征普遍存在，主观感受干扰人们对公平的判断，人们会自觉将自身的付出与回报同他人进行比较，由此产生的公平偏好会引起人们的心理偏差，最终体现在行为决策上。这些研究成果引起了人们对高管主观心理感知的关注，也为高管的行为选择提供了新的解释。因此，本文从薪酬攀比的新视角出发，探寻其是否影响非效率投资，同时检验产品市场竞争的调节效应。

  本文以2013-2019年我国沪深A股上市公司为研究样本，构建了多元回归模型，分析研究了高管薪酬攀比对非效率投资的影响、以及产品市场竞争对薪酬攀比和非效率投资关系的调节效应，在进一步分析中，检验薪酬激励程度是否会缓解或加剧薪酬攀比心理，并通过重新计算非效率投资指标进行了稳健性检验。研究结论表明：第一，高管薪酬攀比与企业非效率投资之间呈“U”型关系；第二，产品市场竞争削弱了薪酬攀比对非效率投资的“U”型影响；第三，薪酬激励程度不足时，薪酬攀比与非效率投资的“U”关系更明显，产品市场竞争的调节更有效。最后，针对本文研究结论提出相关建议：一是要重视高管由于薪酬攀比造成的心理偏差因素；二是可以在薪酬制度设计中引入合理参照体系；三是鼓励企业提高信息披露程度。

     Inefficient investment is difficult to maintain the development of enterprises. Improving investment efficiency and enhancing resource distribution demand prompt solution in the process of development and operation. As a leading character in the process of management in the enterprises, the senior management is directly involved in the key issues of the company's resource distribution, R&D planning, and investment selection. In recent years, the emolument of executives rise constantly, the amount of compensation varies greatly even in the same industry. However, due to the lack of institutional constraints and supervision measures on the behavior of executives, the inequality of executive income has not been alleviated, and even led to corporate governance. Difficulties and other contradictions, the management behavior of executives often deviates from the company's established development goals. Later, more research results such as behavioral finance and experimental economics have confirmed that irrational characteristics are widespread, subjective feelings interfere with people’s judgments of fairness, and people will consciously compare their own contributions and rewards with others. The fairness preference will cause people's psychological deviation, which is finally reflected in behavioral decision-making. These research results have aroused people's attention to the subjective psychological perception of executives, and also provided new explanations for executives' behavioral choices. Therefore, from a new perspective of salary comparison, this article explores whether it affects inefficient investment, at the same time, it examines the governance effect and regulation effect of product market competition.

     In this paper, a multiple regression model is constructed by taking the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2013 to 2019 as research samples. We analyze the influence of executive compensation comparison on inefficient investment, the effectiveness of product market competition in managing inefficient investment and regulatory effect. The market's moderating effect on the relationship between salary scale and inefficient investment is further analyzed to test whether the degree of salary incentive will ease or aggravate the psychology of salary scale, and the robustness test is carried out by recalculating the inefficient investment index. The research conclusions show that: First, there is a "U"-shaped relationship between emolument comparison and inefficient investment; second, product market competition can effectively curb inefficient investment; third, product market competition weakens salary The "U"-shaped relationship of inefficient investment; fourth, the lack of salary incentives amplifies the unfair feeling of executive salary comparison and increases inefficient investment. Finally, some suggestions are given to respond the research conclusions: First, more attention should be paid to the psychological deviation factors caused by salary comparison; second, a reasonable reference system can be introduced in the design of the salary system; third, companies should better ameliorate information disclosure.