会计学院知识库

信息披露作为缓解公司委托代理矛盾的重要制度安排，其历来受到众多学者的关注。资本市场演化和市场环境嬗变，引致具有前瞻性特征的业绩预告信息需求的激增，相较于传统信息披露方式，我国业绩预告披露的非强制和可选择性特征给管理层实施信息披露操纵给予了空间，背离了政府监管主体通过此制度促使上市公司及时传递公司业绩和发展信息，进而增进资本市场运行效率和维护投资者利益的期许。既有研究多从CEO特征，如人口统计学特征、CEO权力和CEO持股等视角考察其对信息披露的影响，然而CEO作为公司信息披露的最终负责人，经理人市场的声誉机制对其所负责的业绩预告信息披露质量是否有影响的研究尚欠。因此，本文聚焦于声誉视角，考察CEO声誉对公司业绩预告质量的影响，具有一定的理论和现实意义。本文将规范研究和实证研究方法相结合，首先对国内外有关文献进行梳理，然后通过分析委托代理理论、信号传递理论和声誉激励理论，构建出CEO声誉与公司业绩预告质量间的理论分析框架，并基此提出实证假说。以A股上市公司2010-2019年的数据为样本，构建计量模型，初步检验CEO声誉对公司业绩预告质量的影响，在此基础上，进一步考察了产权性质、CEO预期任期和地区市场化程度差异下二者影响的异质性，得出以下结论：（1）相比于较低CEO声誉的公司，具有较高CEO声誉的公司其披露的业绩预告信息质量越高；（2）相较于国有企业，非国有企业CEO声誉越高，其所披露的业绩预告质量越高；（3）CEO对自身职业预期任期强化了CEO声誉对公司业绩预告质量的促进作用；（4）公司所处地区市场化程度越高，CEO声誉对公司业绩预告质量的提升效应越明显。上述结论表明声誉机制对上市公司信息披露行为具有一定的激励效应，且外部治理环境越完善，声誉激励治理机制越能发挥作用，然而，CEO考核机制的差异的现实背景亦会影响该机制治理效应的实现。本文进一步丰富了声誉激励研究领域的文献，同时扩增了公司业绩预告质量影响因素的研究。为公司如何制定激励契约安排、监管主体如何提升公司信息披露质量和完善经理人市场建设提供了可能的建议。

As an important institutional arrangement to alleviate the contradiction of the company's entrusted agency,the information disclosure has always attracted the attention of many scholars.The evolution of the capital market and the change of the market environment have led to a sharp increase in demand for performance forecast information with forward-looking characteristics. Compared with the traditional information disclosure methods, the non-mandatory and optional characteristics of our country's performance forecast disclosure have given management to the implementation of information disclosure manipulation,which deviates from the expectations of government regulatory that encourage listed companies to pass on company performance and development information in a timely manner through this system, thereby enhancing the efficiency of the capital market and safeguarding the interests of investors. Existing studies mostly inspect the influence of CEO characteristics, such as demographic characteristics, CEO power and CEO shareholding on information disclosure. However, as the ultimate person in charge of company information disclosure,there is still a lack of research on the reputation mechanism of the manager market to the quality of the information disclosure of the performance forecast. Therefore, this article focuses on the perspective of reputation and examines the impact of CEO reputation on the quality of company performance forecasts, which has a amount of theoretical and practical meaning.This paper combines theoretical analytical normative research with empirical research on measurement models. Firstly, it sorts out relevant domestic and foreign literature,then through the analysis of principal-agent theory, signaling theory, and reputation incentive theory, which constructs relationship and theoretical analysis framework between CEO reputation and the quality of company performance forecasts, and empirical hypotheses based on this. Taking the data of A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019 as a sample, and construct a measurement model to test the influence of CEO reputation on the quality of company performance forecasts. On this basis, the paper further examins CEO reputation on the quality of company performance forecasts under the nature of property rights, the expected tenure of the CEO and the degree of regional marketization,then the following conclusions can be drawn: (1) Compared with companies with lower CEO reputations, companies with higher CEO reputations have higher quality of the performance forecast information disclosed; (2) In state-owned enterprise, CEO reputation has a restraining effect on the quality of company performance forecasts, while in the private enterprise, CEO reputation has a promoting effect on the quality of company performance forecasts; (3) The CEO’s expected term of his career strengthens the promoting impact of CEO reputation on the quality of company performance forecasts; (4) The higher the degree of marketization in the region where the company is located, the more obvious the effect of CEO reputation on the quality of the company’s performance forecast. The above conclusions show that the reputation mechanism has a certain incentive effect on the information disclosure behavior of listed companies, and the better the external governance environment, the more effective the reputation incentive governance mechanism will be. However, the actual background of the difference in the CEO assessment mechanism will also affect the governance effect of the mechanism. This article further enriches the literature in the research field of reputation incentives, and expands the research on the factors affecting the quality of company performance forecasts. It provides possible suggestions for how to formulate incentive contract arrangements for companies, improve the quality of company information disclosure and perfect manager market construction by supervisory entities.