作者曾拼搏
姓名汉语拼音Zeng Pinbo
学号2018000008246
培养单位兰州财经大学
电话18860402032
电子邮件787288259@qq.com
入学年份2018-9
学位类别专业硕士
培养级别硕士研究生
一级学科名称会计
学科代码1253
第一导师姓名李培根
第一导师姓名汉语拼音Li Peigen
第一导师单位兰州财经大学
第一导师职称教授
第二导师姓名李宏杰
第二导师姓名汉语拼音Li Hongjie
第二导师单位甘肃省广播电视网络股份有限公司
第二导师职称高级审计师
题名桃李面包大股东实施高派现动因及财务效果研究
英文题名Research on the Motivation and Financial Effects of Toly Bread's Major Shareholders' Implementation of high-dividend
关键词股利政策 高派现 代理问题 桃李面包
外文关键词Dividend policy; High-dividend; Agent problem; Toly Bread
摘要

公司股利政策研究是公司财务研究的问题之一,关于“股利之谜”仍然未得到妥善的解决。围绕公司派发多少股利、以何种形式进行派发产生了很多讨论,诞生了很多经典股利理论。随着中国资本市场监管政策收紧以及监管机构倡导上市公司进行分红回馈股东,越来越多的上市公司选择分红派现,但由于我国股权集中度高,上市公司股利分红资金绝大多数流入了公司大股东的账户,中小股东所能分到的现金股利总额相对较少;上市公司又倾向于采用股权融资的方式补充公司资金,使得从二级市场取得公司股票的外部投资者获取成本较高,面对相同股利政策所取得的股利收益率相对较低。当上市公司采用高派现股利政策时,是大股东利用合法手段更多占有公司经营成果,忽视中小股东利益诉求,还是大股东与中小股东和谐相处,共同分享公司经营成果,尚无定论。研究这个问题具有重要意义。

本文以大股东实施的高派现股利政策作为切入点,收集国内外文献,利用股利代理理论、股利信号理论和股利迎合理论这些股利政策经典理论,选择中国A股面包第一股——桃李面包作为案例公司,围绕桃李面包大股东实施高派现股利政策的动因,高派现股利政策实施后的财务效果进行分析,研究上市公司大股东实施的股利政策是否有满足大股东利益需求,损害公司健康发展的能力,忽视中小股东利益诉求的嫌疑,然后根据分析结果,指出桃李面包大股东实施的高派现股利政策存在的不足之处,并依据相关理论给出改进建议。

本文研究结论有:(1桃李面包大股东实施高派现股利政策主要动因是迎合大股东资金需求获取再融资资格条件;次要动因是向资本市场传达稳健经营信号,对外部投资者释放降低代理成本信息,推动公司价值增加。(2)债权人监督缺位使桃李面包大股东与中小股东利益分歧加剧,高派现股利政策对公司短期股价影响反而是负面影响。(3)桃李面包大股东实施的高派现股利政策没有起到减少代理成本作用,反而是桃李面包大股东与中小股东代理成本增加的体现。

英文摘要

The research of corporate dividend policy is one of the problems of corporate financial research, and "The mystery of dividend policy" has not yet been properly resolved. There has been a lot of discussion around how many dividends the company distributes and in what form, and many classic dividend theories have been born. With the tightening of China's capital market regulatory policies and regulatory agencies advocating listed companies to pay dividends back to shareholders, more and more listed companies choose to pay dividends, However, due to the high degree of equity concentration in China, most of the dividends of listed companies flow into the accounts of major shareholders, the total amount of cash dividends that small and medium shareholders can receive is relatively small;listed companies tend to use equity financing to supplement company funds,which makes it more expensive for external investors to obtain company stocks from the secondary market. Facing the same dividend policy, the dividend yield is relatively low. When the listed company adopts the policy of high dividend, is it the majority shareholder who uses legal means to occupy more of the company's operating results, ignores the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders, or does the majority shareholders live in harmony with the small and medium-sized shareholders and share the company's operating results. It is of great significance to study this problem.

This article takes the high dividend policy implemented by major shareholders as an entry point, collects domestic and foreign literature, uses the classic dividend policy theories such as the dividend agency theory, the dividend signal theory and the dividend cater theory, and chooses Toly Bread as a case company, focusing on the motivation of Toly Bread's major shareholders to implement the high cash dividend policy, and then select the company's solvency, profitability and profitability,Dividend payment rate and changes in the company's TobinQ, analyze the impact of the high cash dividend policy on the company's financial status and the company's stock price, and then based on the analysis results, pointed out the shortcomings of the high dividend policy implemented by the major shareholders of Toly Bread, and gave suggestions for improvement based on relevant theories.

The main conclusions of this paper are: (1) the main reason for the implementation of the high dividend policy by the majority shareholders of Toly Bread is to meet the capital needs of the major shareholders and obtain the qualification conditions for refinancing, and the secondary reason is to convey sound business signals to the capital market, release information to external investors to reduce the cost of agents, improve the company's reputation and promote the company's value. (2) The absence of creditor supervision has aggravated the differences between the interests of majority shareholders and small shareholders, and the high dividend policy has a negative impact on the company's short-term share price. (3) The high-dividend dividend policy implemented by the majority shareholders of Toly Bread has not played a role in reducing the cost of agency, but rather is the embodiment of the increase in the agency cost of major shareholders and small and medium-sized shareholders of Toly Bread

学位类型硕士
答辩日期2021-05
学位授予地点甘肃省兰州市
语种中文
论文总页数49
参考文献总数54
馆藏号0003737
保密级别公开
中图分类号F23/613
文献类型学位论文
条目标识符http://ir.lzufe.edu.cn/handle/39EH0E1M/29333
专题会计学院
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曾拼搏. 桃李面包大股东实施高派现动因及财务效果研究[D]. 甘肃省兰州市. 兰州财经大学,2021.
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