Agency of ultimate owner, modes of the separation of control rights from cash flow rights and private benefits of control

	Agency of ultimate owner, modes of the separation of control rights from cash flow rights and private benefits of control
	Liu, Xing 1; Fu, Qiang1,2 ; Hao, Ying 1
	2015-01-25
发表期刊	Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice
卷号	35 期号:1 页码:75-85
摘要	In this paper, we examine the characteristics of private benefits behavior of control by different modes of the separation of control rights from cash flow rights under the framework of ultimate owner agency. The results show that: 1) the level of private benefits of control has a positive correlation with the separation of the two rights, a negative correlation with cash flow rights of the controlling shareholder and a negative correlation with the degree of legal protection of shareholders' rights; 2) in a dual-class equity structure, the level of private benefits of control of the ultimate owner increases with multiples of voting rights of the superior class by diminishing marginal speed and the most common arrangement is a 10:1 structure in which the superior class has ten votes per share and the inferior class has one vote per share; in a pyramid equity structure, the level of private benefits of control of ultimate owner increases with tiers of the pyramid by diminishing marginal speed and the ultimate owner usually controls the operating company by a three-tier pyramid control chain; in a cross-ownership structures, the level of private benefits of control of ultimate controller increases with the number of companies within the group and the ultimate controller tends to create a huge business empire; 3) the numerical results show that the levels of the private benefits of control of the ultimate controller of China's listed companies are between 6% and 8%. ©, 2015, Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.
关键词	Shareholders Agency conflict Controlling shareholders Modes of the separation of the two rights Negative correlation Numerical results Operating companies Positive correlations Ultimate owner
收录类别	EI
ISSN	10006788
语种	中文
出版者	Systems Engineering Society of China
EI入藏号	20151200650720
文献类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	http://ir.lzufe.edu.cn/handle/39EH0E1M/1817
专题	统计与数据科学学院
作者单位	1.School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing; 2.400030, China; 3.School of Statistics, Lanzhou University of Finance and Economics, Lanzhou; 4.730020, China
第一作者单位	经济学院
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Liu, Xing,Fu, Qiang,Hao, Ying. Agency of ultimate owner, modes of the separation of control rights from cash flow rights and private benefits of control[J]. Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice,2015,35(1):75-85.
APA	Liu, Xing,Fu, Qiang,&Hao, Ying.(2015).Agency of ultimate owner, modes of the separation of control rights from cash flow rights and private benefits of control.Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice,35(1),75-85.
MLA	Liu, Xing,et al."Agency of ultimate owner, modes of the separation of control rights from cash flow rights and private benefits of control".Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice 35.1(2015):75-85.